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abstract
The publication in 2009 of John Watts’s The Making of Polities renewed interest not 
only in the causal relation that is habitually taken for granted nowadays between 
war and the development of state institutions in the late medieval centuries (a 
question about which recent English historiography has produced other works of 
enormous interest), but also in the appropriateness of state categories to think about 
the changes that, driven by war or not, took place then in the field of the forms of 
political organisation of Western Europe. This paper looks at the the historiographic 
origins and development of the state-centred model of explaining those changes, 
and then explores (especially as regards the evolution of the idea of war itself) 
the potential for a jurisdictionalist model which, through a more contextualized 
reading of sources and closer attention to its long-term deployment since the 12th 
century, has been reconstructing the recent legal and related historiographies from, 
especially, southern European countries.1
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 1 Genly Ai stated: “Though I had been nearly two years on Winter I was 
still far from being able to see the people of the planet through their own 
eyes. I tried to, but my efforts took the form of self-consciously seeing 
a Gethenian first as a man, then as a woman, forcing him into those 
categories so irrelevant to his nature and so essential to my own”. 2
“The importance of concepts derives from their relationship to action.”3
1. State dynamic or translation problem?
War is rompimiento de Reynos, o Principes, o comunidades, as Sebastián de Covarrubias 
described it in the early 17th century, to which he also added —and he must have 
known being both a renowned lexicographer and chaplain to such a belligerent 
king as Phillip II— that conversely we use the term guerrilla, quando entre particulares 
ay pendencia, y enemistad formada, que acuden unos a una parte, y otros a otra, pero estas 
castigan los Principes de las republicas severamente.4 Nowadays anyone finding both 
definitions together would perhaps find no reason not to suppose, being carried 
away by a false sense of familiarity with “Siglo de Oro” Spanish, that particulares 
in the second definition could refer to nothing other than persons or individuals 
who, as such, act in the private context and whose resort to arms to settle their 
differences was obviously punished by those who embodied public authority, the 
only ones to whom the legitimate use of armed force corresponds. Perhaps that 
reading might even equate those concepts not with kingdoms, communities or 
republics but (aiming to make them easier to understand by a modern mind) States, 
since (whether singular or plural) this is the term that today most commonly evokes 
1. This study is part of the research project HAR-2009-13225 financed by the Ministry of Science and
Innovation of the Government of Spain. A draft version of the text was discussed in the meeting about 
Desenvolupaments bèl·lics al segle XII held in the Rovira i Virgili University in September 2012. My thanks 
to María Bonet Donato, Pere Benito Monclús, Carlos Estepa Díez, Amancio Isla Frez, Carlos Laliena 
Corbera and Pascual Martínez Sopena, who attended the above-mentioned meeting, for their pertinent 
observations on what I presented there. Ramón Vargas-Machuca Ortega and José Luis Rodríguez Sández, 
as well as two anonymous evaluators, also deserve my gratitude for the valuable suggestions they made 
after a careful reading of the full text, so that all errors and deficiencies in this final version can only be 
imputed to the contumacy or negligence of the author. Thanks go to Rafael Galán Moya for revising the 
translation into English.
2. Le Guin, Ursulak. The Left Hand of Darkness. New York: Ace Books, 1969: chapter 1.
3. Richter, Melvin. “Introduction: Translation, the History of Concepts and the History of Political
Thought”, Why Concepts Matter: Translating Social and Political Thought, Martin, J. Burke, Melvin Richter, 
eds. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012: 9.
4. “breaking of Kingdoms, or Princes, or communities”, “when there are disputes between individuals,
and enmity formed, they all turn to one side, and other on another, but these punish the Princes of 
the republics severely”. Covarrubias, Sebastián de. Tesoro de la lengua castellana, o española. Madrid: Luis 
Sánchez impresor, 1611: 455r. <http://fondosdigitales.us.es/fondos/libros/765/16/tesoro-de-la-lengua-
castellana-o-espanola/>.
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the idea of public authority, the territory it is projected onto, and the matters that 
are specific to it. Also around 1600, war, the rompimiento or rift that it should only 
be appropriate to call so, would finally become a question of and between States. At 
least in this respect, the past does not seem to be, as has been oft repeated lately, a 
foreign country.5
In identical circumstances, a professional historian would undoubtedly exercise 
greater prudence when choosing concepts. Consider one of the most recent 
volumes published in one of the leading collections for academic history, the French 
“Nouvelle Clio”, a work dedicated to the century which covered most of the life 
of the author of the Tesoro and that furthermore pays very special attention to 
the Hispanic Monarchy.6 Assuredly, States also appear here, right from the title of 
the work, as subjects and actors in a scenario which seems to be of “international 
relations”, in whose development in the 16th century armed conflicts played a very 
notable part, to the point that war was precisely, as the book stated, il piu formidabile 
vettore della crescita dello Stato moderno.7 However, opting for these concepts means 
the author feels obliged to start by offering some explanations, aware that they 
are not as evident and unequivocal as they may seem. On one hand, he states that 
talking about “international relations” could justifiably be anachronistic, as in the 
16th century il termine ’nazione’ non ha il senso che acquisirà a partire dal XVIII secolo,8 
to which he adds that it should be borne in mind that, although its weight grew as 
the century went by, then lo Stato non ha il monopolio delle relazioni diplomatiche.9 On 
the other hand, regarding the reality that one wishes to imply with the word State, 
always written with a capital letter, the difficulties this generates are revealed by the 
fact that the identical epigraph used to title two chapters of the book, one devoted 
to the techniques of government and the other to political ideas and practices, does 
little more than revive an old question formulated by Federico Chabod over fifty 
years ago: “Is there a State in the Renaissance?” The interrogative form was also 
used in the epigraph heading one of the sections of the bibliography of the volume: 
“Genesis of the modern State?”. Indeed the author thinks that la riflessione sullo 
Stato del Rinascimento sembra essere giunta a una forma di aporia storiografica10 and, in 
any case, it should not remain in the paradigm suggested by the last epigraph cited, 
which has been the key to the dominant reading in recent decades while also the 
5. A topic about which an essential reflection is Chittolini, Giorgio. “Un paese lontano”. Società e storia,
26 (2003): 331-354.
6. Tallon, Alain. L’Europe au XVIe siècle: États et relations internationales. Paris: Presses Universitaires de
France, 2010. I use here the Italian translation: Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del Cinquecento: Stati e relazioni 
internazionali. Rome: Carocci, 2013.
7. “the most formidable vector for the development of the modern State”. Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del
Cinquecento...: 157.
8. “the term ’nation’ did not have the sense it would acquire from the 18th century”. Tallon, Alain.
L’Europa del Cinquecento...: 17.
9. “the State does not have the monopoly on diplomatic relations”. Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del
Cinquecento...: 16.
10. “the reflection about the State of the Renaissance seems to have reached a kind of historiographic
impasse”. Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del Cinquecento...: 209.
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subject of intense debates. The author explains why he, in the end, favours a State-
centred explanation: 
Da questi dibattiti, a volte assai vivace, sulle nozioni di Stato e di nazione / si può tuttavia 
desumere che il XVI secolo vede una affermazione senza precedenti del potere statale, uno 
’Stato-patrimonio’ più che uno Stato-nazione, senza che questa concezione nazionale sia 
assente o in contraddizione con la prima.11 
However, given such a detour and the necessity for adjectives to qualify the State 
that really existed in that time, it does not seem misplaced or meaningless to ask if 
the problem is not more in the substantive.
The problem, if you like, is one of translation, as suggested above, an operation as 
necessary as it is delicate; of translation, understood here, from the language of the 
sources to the language of the historian, which although they can be same language 
can also correspond to different phases of its evolution, which inevitably places a 
filter between the two —a cultural filter between two different contexts— which 
should not be ignored. In the introduction to La société féodale, Marc Bloch stated 
that “las palabras son como monedas muy usadas: a fuerza de circular de mano en mano, 
pierden su relieve etimológico”.12 Some years earlier, Lucien Febvre, with his habitual 
belligerent eloquence, reproached Julien Benda for appealing to a supposedly 
timeless, “metaphysical” idea of nation in using this word in his Esquisse d’une 
histoire des Français dans leur volonté d’être une nation:
Lo que usted ha hecho es solamente reforzar la tendencia a tomar las palabras más claras 
hoy para los hombres de hoy como confortables y seguros vehículos con que remontar el curso 
de los siglos, sin necesidad de cambiar nunca de sitio o de medio de transporte.13
Despite such warnings, issued in the interwar period by two such enormously 
influential figures in the later development of the historical discipline during the 
20th century, it seems that it was not until more recently that historians have begun 
to take seriously and discuss in depth the problems derived from their condition as 
“translators”.14 Conversely, for a long time and in general, they have rather tended 
11. “From these debates, sometimes very lively, around the notions of State and nation, one can 
nevertheless derive that the 16th century saw an unprecedented affirmation of state power, a ’patrimonial 
State’ more than a nation-State, without this national conception being absent or in contradiction with 
the former”. Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del Cinquecento...: 17.
12. “words, like well-worn coins, in the course of constant circulation lose their clear outline”. I cite the 
version in Bloch, Marc. La sociedad feudal. Mexico: Unión Tipográfica Editorial Hispano Americana, 1979: 
I, 2-3.
13. “What you have done is only reinforce the tendency to take the clearest words for today’s men as 
comfortable and safe vehicles with which to go back through the centuries, without the need ever to 
change place or means of transport.” Febvre, Lucien. Combates por la historia. Barcelona: Ariel, 1970: 129.
14. Adams, William Paul. “The Historian as Translator: An Introduction”. The Journal of American History, 
85/4 (1999): 1283-1289; Ghosh, Peter. “Translation as a Conceptual Act”. Max Weber Studies, 2/1 (2001): 
59-63; and above all now Why Concepts Matter cit., especially on this point the contribution by Palonen, 
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to avoid such a condition, or at least to conduct themselves, with more or less 
awareness, first as enthusiastic followers of Jorge Luis Borges in his defence of the 
translator’s “creative infidelity” than as firm supporters in this matter (which seems 
more de rigueur among those who aim to study the changes in societies over time) 
of Octavio Paz’s attitude, who, a defender of fidelity to and respect for the source 
text to safeguard its differences, saw in this the way that the translator se obliga a 
reconocer que el mundo no termina en nosotros y que el hombre es los hombres.15
To return to the question that concerns us here: for the entire “long Middle Ages” 
that Jacques Le Goff speaks of, or alternatively the longs temps modernes that others 
favour16 (although it is a more equivocal expression), that is, the period of Western 
history between the 12th and 18th centuries, it can be said what is nowadays less 
disputed about the chronology traditionally labelled Middle Ages: namely, that there 
is then no equivalent of the term State in its current political definition (that is to say, 
no sooner than its meaning as a specific, and therefore historical, form of political 
organization is taken seriously). The word state does exist, but none of its meanings 
corresponds with this definition, as can be easily checked with a contextualised 
reading of the entry in the Covarrubias’s lexicon we started with.17 And there is 
also a political vocabulary specific to that age, none of whose terms is a direct 
equivalent, as we argued. Therefore, translating this vocabulary when the occasion 
arises by resorting to the state categories amounts to resorting to what is usually 
called, in grammar, a false friend, as well as ignoring that (as Reinhart Koselleck 
has insisted over the recent decades) all translation involves a reconceptualization; 
in the German historian’s words: Toda traducción al propio presente implica una historia 
conceptual.18
Thus, to talk about the difficulties that affected the process of “State Building” 
in the 12th century in the Christian principalities in the Near East, or considering 
in the same way, or even as “state-rebuilding”, the progress of the Castilian-
Leonese Reconquest around the same time, to cite two recent examples,19 is at 
least imprecise and equally leads to confusion. However, let us move on and 
Kari. “Reinhart Koselleck on Translation, Anachronism and Conceptual Change”, Why concepts matter: 
translating social and political thought, Martin J. Burke, Melvin Richte, eds. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2012: 
73-92.
15. “is forced to recognize that the world does not end in us and that man is men”. See Sáenz, Miguel. 
Servidumbre y grandeza de la traducción. Madrid: Real Academia Española, 2013, which is the author’s 
speech on entering this institution and where I take the quotes from.
16. Tallon, Alain. L’Europa del Cinquecento...: 15.
17. A relevant comment can be found in Clavero, Bartolomé. Razón de estado, razón de individuo, razón de 
historia. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1991: 16-21.
18. “All translation into the present implies a conceptual history”. Koselleck, Reinhart. Historias de 
conceptos: estudios sobre semántica y pragmática del lenguaje político y social. Madrid: Trotta, 2012: 10. However, 
the original text the quote is taken from dates from 1986.
19. Barber, Malcolm. “The Challenge of State Building in the Twelfth Century: the Crusader States in 
Palestine and Syria”. Reading Medieval Studies, 36 (2010): 7-22; Purkis, William J. “Eleventh-and Twelfth-
Century Perspectives of State Building in the Iberian Peninsula”. Reading Medieval Studies, 36 (2010): 57-
75. This is a monographic issue of the journal dedicated to “Crusading and State Building in the Central 
Middle Ages”.
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place ourselves in the last centuries conventionally still regarded as medieval, 
in relation with which the focus of State-building appears more elaborate and is 
most commonly accepted. Let us do so, however, from a perspective of continuity 
regarding the immediately preceding centuries, that is, without the “14th-century 
crisis” intervening and making us lose sight of the developments in matters of 
political organisation that had taken place before the “crisis”, in the 12th and 13th 
centuries, during the period of European expansion and deployment. This is 
precisely the perspective that John Watts adopts in his important recent efforts to 
rescue the late Medieval centuries, as far as their political history is concerned, from 
their habitual consideration as centuries of transition or transformation between 
the “medieval” and the “early modern”, that is, of their ambiguous or ambivalent 
treatment around ideas of exhaustion and conclusion on one hand, and genesis 
and delivery, on the other.20 And it is precisely from that standpoint that Watts 
forestalls the emphasis on the part played by war in the usual narrative and image 
that traditional and less traditional historians construct of the 14th and 15th 
centuries. The former group of historians draw on war as another factor whose 
frequency and ubiquity, together with other well-known calamities, contributed 
decisively to giving the late Middle Ages, or at least part of this, a rather sombre 
character. The second group, those historians less attached to the renowned —and 
soon centennial— “autumn” metaphor, who form a majority nowadays, invoke 
war as the “midwife” (in Watts’ own expression) of the modern State —that is to 
say, as the major cause (actually an independent explanatory variable in many 
cases) in the unfolding of a new taxation (a State taxation, it is claimed) that 
would be at the basis of a new institutional reality, the modern State, whose origin 
or genesis thus becomes the overarching element of the political history of the late 
Middle Ages.
However, Watts thinks that this stereotypical view of the Late Middle Ages as 
an age of greater armed conflictivity is not justified. Neither the size of armies 
deployed, nor its duration and intensity or destructive capacity made war undergo 
any significant change compared with the earlier period, at least prior to the 
outbreak of the Italian Wars of the middle of the last decade of the 15th century.21 
20. Watts, John. The Making of Polities: Europe 1300-1500. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University 
Press, 2009. What is said below only aims to echo Watts’ approach. For a more detailed analysis, see 
Challet, Vincent. “John Watts, The Making of Polities (Europe, 1300-1500)”. Cahiers de recherches médiévales 
et humanistes. (2009) [5 september 2010]. Garnier Éditions Classiques. 8 september 2013. <http://crm.
revues.org/12070>; Lazzarini, Isabella. “Il sistema politico europeo alla fine del medioevo. A proposito di 
un libro di John Watts”. Storica, 48 (2010): 121-134.
21. This date also serves as a turning point in the periodisation used by Black, Jeremy. War: A Short 
History. London & New York: Continuum, 2009. Contrary to the idea of the existence of a “military 
revolution” in early modern Europe and in favour of placing the emphasis in the military history 
of the continent more on the elements of continuity and a slow and gradual evolution between the 
medieval and early modern periods, while rejecting the simplicity which has sometimes been seen in 
the development and characterístics of warfare in the Middle Ages, Black states that “it is unclear that 
early-modern warfare was more brutal, in Europe or elsewhere, than its medieval predecessor” (Black, 
Jeremy. War: A Short History...: 71). On the other hand, John France, another leading specialist in military 
history, concluded that between 1300 and 1650 “much progress had been made in adapting to the 
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It would have been an exaggerated and undue generalisation of the experience 
of the kingdom of France, the main scenario of the Hundred Years War, and the 
greater abundance and descriptive wealth of the sources that led to this error of 
appreciation.
Although they were not more frequent or very different from those of the 
immediately previous centuries, it is obvious that there were wars in the Late 
Middle Ages. However, Watts does not believe these should be considered “the 
great motor of later medieval political life”.22 These wars were the cause but 
also the effect and consequence of the changes that were then occurring in the 
forms of organisation and modes of political action, which were thus not only the 
result of the pressure exerted by war, but also factors in their outbreak. Was it 
“War made the state, and the state made war” as Charles Tilly summarised from 
historical sociology in a famous formula in the mid 1970s?23 This was not exactly 
so, as in Watts’ opinion, the adoption of a state perspective distorts the nature of 
those changes, initiated in the 12th and 13th centuries and to understand which 
the notion of State is nowadays of little use, and is even an encumbrance. This is 
because, among other reasons, even when it were possible to recognise practices 
of power identifiable as statist, these were far from being either the only ones or 
the norm, and placing emphasis on these hinders recognition of “the interaction 
of a multiplicity of valid and effective power forms and power types” typical of the 
period.24 And, on the other hand, because the interpretative framework of State 
growth contributes “surprisingly little”, in fact, to explain the course of political 
events in the 14th and 15th centuries.25
new gunpowder technology, but European armies remained incoherent, ill-organised and ill-disciplined” 
(France, John. Perilous Glory: The Rise of Western Military Power. New Haven & London: Yale University 
Press, 2011: 163). A decade earlier, the same historian had noted the imbalance between the enormous 
attraction that the military history of the last two centuries of the Middle Ages exerted and the much 
lesser interest generated by the rest of the period: France, John, “Recent Writing on Medieval Warfare: 
From the Fall of Rome to c. 1300”. The Journal of Military History, 65/2 (2001): 441-473. For a wide-
ranging discussion about continuity and change in European military history between the 14th and 18th 
centuries, see European Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. Frank Tallet, David J.B. Trim. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press, 2010.
22. Watts, John. The Making of Polities...: 25.
23. Tilly, Charles. “Reflections on the History of European State-Making”, The Formation of National States 
in Western Europe, Charles Tilly ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975: 42. For a recent attempt 
to update and validate Tilly’s theses, associating them with the idea of a series of military revolutions, 
see Fortmann, Michel. Les Cycles de Mars: révolutions militaires et édification étatique de la Renaissance a nos 
jours. Paris: Economica, 2010. See also Morillo, Stephen; Michael F. Pavkovic. What Is Military History?. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013: 77 and following, on the controversies over the very idea of “military 
revolution”, which bring into relief the relevance of said idea to military history’s rehabilitation as a 
discipline during the second half of the 20th century (a relevance that seems much less justified in light 
of its questionable intrinsic consistency and explanatory power).
24. Watts, John. The Making of Polities...: 32-33.
25. Watts, John. The Making of Polities...: 33.
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2. Historiography
Naturally, the state or statist focus is far from being recent. After all, history as 
an academic discipline arose in the 19th century hand in hand with, and in the 
service to, the State, above all as an exercise in the latter’s legitimation. The original 
professional historian was a civil servant, an employee charged with a public 
function that was understood as being exclusive to the State. And in the wake of 
a statist culture —in which we have been also educated and socialised as citizens 
since then—, successive generations of historians have grown accustomed to 
thinking of politics, or the political, in relation with, if not as synonyms of, the State. 
Identifying the acts or organisational forms characteristic of a given field of action 
or social experience which the historian isolates and labels as the sphere of politics; 
identifying thus all of that as “natural”, and all legitimate political power with what 
is proper of the State, somehow constitutes “historiographic commonsense”.26
The approach that links war, taxation and the configuration of the State is not 
really an invention of recent decades. In the first decade of the 20th century, Otto 
Hintze, one of the fathers of modern comparative constitutional history, explicitly 
indicated the importance of mutual relations between military organisation and 
state organisation, especially underlining the dependence of the latter on the 
demands derived from the balance of power between States, a balance basically, if 
not exclusively, guaranteed by military force.27 Then, just after the end of the Great 
War, the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter, nowadays a classic in his discipline 
and one who, in contrast with others, never ignored the historical dimension of the 
problems he dealt with, could state that “taxes not only helped to create the state. 
They helped to form it”. These taxes had been introduced to cover the growing 
military expenses of the European princes from the end of the Middle Ages.28
Seen nowadays with hindsight, Hintze’s and Schumpeter’s pioneering works 
clearly show how not only concepts, but also the burning questions of their time, 
were projected in historiography. In the former case, this was the state-building of 
the Second Reich, and in the latter, the fiscal crisis that was intensely debated on the 
eve of the creation of the First Austrian Republic.
However, the golden age of social history in the decades immediately after 
the Second World War relegated the State to the historiographic background. 
Obviously, this was linked to the rise of the French Annales and their belligerent 
rejection of political history, a political history adapted, and sometimes deliberately 
26. I appropriate here the expressive utterance coined by Grendi, Edoardo. “Del senso comune 
storiografico”. Quaderni Storici, 41 (1979): 698-707.
27. Hintze, Otto. “Military Organization and the Organization of the State”, The Historical Essays of Otto 
Hintze, Felix Gilbert, ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975: 178-215. For more on Hintze: Schiera, 
Pierangelo. Otto Hintze. Naples: Guida, 1974.
28. Schumpeter, Joseph. “The Crisis of the Tax State”, The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, Richard 
Swedberg, ed. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991: 99-140, the quote on p. 108. For the context 
in which Schumpeter elaborated this work, shortly before becoming head of the Treasury in the first 
government of the Republic of Austria: McCraw, Thomas K. Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and 
Creative Destruction. Boston: Harvard University Press, 2007: 93-103.
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characterised to condense in the eyes of the annalists everything that served to 
identify the historiographic enemy, the adversary whose defeat was a condition for 
their own affirmation. However, I would like to draw attention to the fact that this 
disappearance or overshadowing of the State was not limited to the discipline of 
history. The same happened in all the so-called social sciences, just in the decades 
when history showed its greatest willingness for dialogue with these disciplines (and 
an even greater inclination to imitate them). It must also be said that this was to the 
detriment of its traditional proximity and collaboration with philology. It was only in 
the 1970s that the State returned to the foreground.29 The emergence of American 
historical sociology, with its renewed interest in the question of the formation of 
the nation States, together with the rise of the New Institutional Economy, also in 
the USA, whose dominance in the field of the social sciences did nothing but reflect 
its condition as a new economic powerhouse and pre-eminent political power on 
the international stage after the Second World War, were two notable examples of 
this “return” of the State to the historiographic proscenium promoted from related 
research fields. 
This phenomenon remained linked to warfare, with the war being fought then 
between the two blocks the post-war world had been divided into: the Cold War. 
In Europe, after 1968, “Western Marxism” seemed to have rediscovered that class 
struggle finally had to be fought in the political arena, and that also generated 
renewed attention towards the State as a subject of research. In America, from 
the 1950s, no less pragmatic considerations inspired what was called the “theory 
of modernisation”.30 This, converted into foreign policy doctrine, was adopted by 
the US administration, most notably under Kennedy and Johnson in the 1960s, 
and applied to counter the attraction that communism could exert in Third World 
countries.
The “theory of modernisation” was an inevitable reference for the social sciences 
in those decades, one that they had to deal with, either to identify themselves with 
it, or to mark distances from it. In an autobiographical work, the anthropologist 
Clifford Geertz remembered its ubiquity until well into the 1970s.31 A dense 
institutional conglomerate of universities together with government agencies and 
private foundations was woven around it. The academy does not seem to have 
been precisely an ivory tower. The theory sprang from the distinction between 
traditional and modern societies, and postulated the existence of a series of states or 
stages through which the former, the traditional societies, became modern societies. 
The State had a relevant role in this development, as “the building of an effective 
29. Skocpol, Theda. “Bringing the State back in: strategies of analysis in current research”, Bringing the 
State back in, Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Theda Skocpol, eds. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge 
University Press, 1985: 3-43.
30. See, for all, Gilman, Nils. Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America. Baltimore 
& London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003.
31. Geertz, Clifford. “An Inconstant Profession: The Anthropological Life in Interesting Times”. Annual 
Review of Anthropology, 31 (2002): 1-19.
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centralized national state” constituted “a necessary condition for take-off”.32 The 
basis for the theory was sought in European history, which thus served as a model 
that it was aimed to universalise. 
In fact, what the “theory of modernisation” generated was a mirror relationship 
between the expectations that it wilfully projected into the future (the future of 
the poor non-aligned countries) and its reconstruction of the past (the past of the 
countries which managed to grow rich in the West), which thus inevitably tended 
to model the latter in line with, or under the influence of, those expectations. What 
it led to was a kind of “colonisation” also of the West’s own past, of submitting 
this past to the present. However, historiographically speaking, the “theory of 
modernisation” has been considered one of “the three main schools of Western 
historical interpretation in the twentieth century”,33 together with Marxism and the 
Annales, such was its influence on American historiography in the second half of 
the last century.34
It was in this intellectual climate that On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State 
was gestated by Joseph Strayer. Its first version dates from 1961 and it was finally 
published as the book we all know in 1970.35 While the 1950s in Europe had 
concluded with “the medieval dissolution of the State”, which Giovanni Tabacco 
had dutifully detailed when reviewing the most important works about the post-
Carolingian period from around the middle of the century,36 the 1960s saw how 
the state creature was resurrected in America with no need to wait for the end of 
the Middle Ages, not as a finished reality, but rather as the budding of something 
“modern”. The operation could well be described as a second episode of the “revolt 
of the medievalists”, after the first one by another American historian, Charles 
Homer Haskins, who, in 1927, published The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century,37 
which put back the start of “modernity”, pace Burckhardt, to a fully medieval time.
32. Rostow, Walt Whitman. The Stages of Economics Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge (UK): 
Cambridge University Press, 1960: 7.
33. Appleby, Joyce; Hunt, Lynn; Jacob, Margaret. Telling the Truth about History. New York & London: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 1994: 78.
34. There were also examples of explicit reception in 1970s European historiography, as shown by 
Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. Teoria de la modernizzazione e storia. Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1991 (original ed.: 1975).
35. Strayer, Joseph. On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970: 
“On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State should be understood”, Bruce Holsinger does not hesitate to 
state, “not simply as a contribution to the historiography of medieval political formation, but as a central 
text in the thriving corpus of modernization theory —one that exemplifies a compelling link between its 
historical claims and the ideological needs of the moment”. Holsinger, Bruce. “Medievalization Theory: 
From Tocqueville to the Cold War”. American Literary History, 22/4 (2010): 893-912, the quote on pp. 
896-897. See also Cantor, Norman F. Inventing the Middle Ages. New York: William Morrow and Company, 
Inc., 1991: 277-286.
36. Tabacco, Giovanni. “La dissoluzione medievale dello stato nella recente storiografia”. Studi medievali, 
1/2 (1960): 397-446, later included in Tabacco, Giovanni. Sperimentazioni del potere nell’alto medioevo. 
Turin: Einaudi, 1993: 245-303.
37. Haskins, Charles Homer. The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century. Cambridge (USA): Harvard University 
Press, 1927. “The revolt of the medievalists” is, as is known, the title of the last chapter of the classic 
work by Ferguson, Wallace K. The Renaissance in Historical Thought: Five Centuries of Interpretation. New 
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Strayer had been a student and disciple of Haskins, and would be the most loyal 
follower of the points of view of the master, who is held to be the initiator of North-
American professional medievalism and with whom Strayer shared integrally 
“the project of making the Middle Ages the starting point for modern authority 
and modern liberty”.38 While, regarding freedom, Haskins dated the birth of the 
“individual” to the 13th century, regarding authority, Strayer also dated the first 
stirrings of the State to that same century. One could go as far as to say that Strayer, 
who simultaneously taught medieval history in Princeton and worked for the CIA, 
was the incarnation among medievalists of something like “the quiet American” 
of Graham Greene’s novel.39 In any case, his elitist and paternalistic liberalism 
prolonged the naive liberal idealism that Haskins represented in the interwar period 
through the years of the Cold War.
On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State and a compilation of other shorter works 
by Strayer published in 1971, as a kind of conclusion to his career, were glowingly 
reviewed in Annales in 1972 by Bernard Guenée, who had begun to collaborate 
with the journal some years earlier, after Charles-Edmond Perrin, a former protégé 
of Marc Bloch and mentor of Georges Duby, had effusively greeted —as did Duby in 
Annales itself— the publication of Guenée’s thesis in 1963.40 In 1972, Guenée had also 
just published the volume of the collection “Nouvelle Clio” about the late-medieval 
“States”, one that would consecrate him as an essential reference hereafter.41 In the 
context of French historiography, this was the first attempt to resurrect annaliste-
style political history, after the paralysis to which had been condemned because of 
the determined and combative bid by the journal for social history. It is worth citing 
Guenée, as he expressed himself in a truly programmatic article in 1964 in which 
he advocated the legitimacy of a history centred on the relations between rulers and 
the ruled although still rooted in social reality:
York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948. More recently, the motto gave rise to an examination of what 
remains of Haskins’ proposals in the historiography of the recent decades in Melve, Leidulf. “’The 
revolt of the medievalists’. Directions in recent research on the twelfth-century renaissance”. Journal of 
Medieval History, 32 (2006): 231-252. See also the recent Noble, Thomas F.X. “Introduction”, European 
Transformations: The Long Twelfth Century, Thomas F.X. Noble, John Van Engen, eds. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
Notre Dame University Press, 2012: 1-16.
38. Freedman, Paul; Gabrielle M. Spiegel. “Medievalism Old and New: The Rediscovery of Alterity in 
North American Medieval Studies”. American Historical Review, 103/3 (1998): 677-704, 683.
39. For his fictional character, the British novelist seems to have been inspired by a real person, 
increasingly notorious in the 1950s, whose personality and adventures as an agent of the American 
intelligence services also serves as a thread in the work of historical reconstruction by Nashel, Jonathan, 
Edward Landsdale’s Cold War. Amherst &Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 2005. For Strayer’s 
links with the CIA and his work as an assessor for the Agency, see Holsinger, Bruce. “Medievalization 
Theory...”: 897-899.
40. Guenée, Bernard. “Pouvoir politique et féodalité”. Annales Économies Societés Civilisations, 27/3 (1972): 
690-691; Guenée, Bernard. “Les origines médiévales de l’État moderne”. Annales Économies Societés 
Civilisations, 27/3 (1972): 704; Perrin, Charles-Edmond. “Tribunaux et gens de justice dans le bailliage de 
Senlis à la fin du moyen âge”. Journal des savants (1965): 515-530; Duby, Georges. “Institutions et Société: 
Une monographie pleine de sève”. Annales Économies, Societés, Civilisations, 19/4 (1964): 795-798.
41. Guenée, Bernard. L’Occident aux XIVe et XVe siècles: Les États. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1971.
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Cette histoire, il faut la nommer. Histoire administrative, histoire institutionelle, histoire 
des institutions ne conviennent pas. Ce ne sont que des parties du tout qu’on veut définir. 
Histoire politique conviendrait peut-être, mais le mot a été pris dans un sens si étroit, et si 
moqué, depuis si longtemps, qu’il serait sans doute responsable de fâcheux malentendus. 
Pourquoi ne pas parler, comme H. Pirenne et M. Bloch ont pu le faire, d’histoire de l’ État? 
L’expression n’est pas trop usée; elle est bien vague mais n’est pas compromise; elle nécessite 
une définition mais se prête à toutes les ambitions. En attendant qu’un esprit inventif mette 
en circulation un nouvel adjectif, ou que le mot ’politique’ ait terminé son purgatoire et 
réintegré le paradis de la vraie histoire, je continuerai à parler d’histoire de l’État.42
At the start of the 1970s, the times seemed to help. I have mentioned above 
the “return of the State” as a characteristic phenomenon of the decade in the 
field of social sciences. Guenée could regale Strayer from the pages of Annales and 
congratulate himself openly for having an influential ally on the other side of the 
Atlantic. Duby himself, recently arrived in the Sorbonne, surprised all and sundry 
by accepting Gallimard’s commission to write Le dimanche de Bouvines, with which, 
not just political history, but also battle history, the much-maligned éveneméntielle 
history, seemed to have reached the point of rehabilitation.43 After Duby published 
the book in 1973, the review by Guenée, again in the pages of Annales, put things 
in their place and cleared up misunderstandings: the event, réhabilité et même glorifié, 
est enraciné dans cette histoire des structures et des mentalités sur laquelle a porté l’essentiel de 
l’effort de l’école historique française dans les cinquante dernières années.44
However, one could think that, in a certain sense, Guenée arrived late. It would 
not be around the “history of the State”, but rather that of power, an even vaguer, 
imprecise and elusive term, where the greatest capacity to renew political history 
would be concentrated in the following decades. And the brilliant idea was soon 
at home in the early 70s, endorsed by who was already a member of the editorial 
board of Annales, Jacques Le Goff.45 The 1970s would see the end of many of the 
42. “This history requires a name. Administrative history, institutional history, history of the institutions, 
are of no use. They are no more than parts of the whole that we wish to define. Perhaps political history 
would serve, but the name has been understood in such a narrow sense and was so long ago turned 
into an object of ridicule that it would lead to bothersome misunderstandings. Why do we not talk, as H. 
Pirenne and M. Bloch did, about history of the State? The expression is not too worn; it is very vague and 
does not commit; it needs a definition but it lends itself to any purpose. While waiting for an inventive 
spirit to put a new adjective into circulation, or for the word “politics” to end its purgatory and return to 
the paradise of true history, I will continue to use history of the State”. Guenée, Bernard. “L’histoire de 
l’État en France à la fin du Moyen Age vue par les historiens français depuis cent ans”. Revue historique, 
232/2 (1964): 331-360, 345, then also in Politique et histoire au moyen-âge: recueil d’articles sur l’histoire 
politique et l’historiographie médiévale (1956-1981). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1981: 3-32.
43. Duby, Georges. La historia continúa. Madrid: Debate, 1992: 120-127.
44. “rehabilitated and even glorified, is rooted in this history of the structures and mentalities to which 
the bulk of the French historical school has devoted its efforts over the last fifty years”. Guenée, Bernard. 
“Le dimanche de Bouvines. 27 juillet 1214”. Annales Économies Societés Civilisations, 29/6 (1974): 1523-
1526.
45. Fernández Albadalejo, Pablo. “La historia política: de una encrucijada a otra”, Balance de la historiografía 
modernista 1973-2001: Actas del VI Coloquio de Metodología Histórica Aplicada (Homenaje al profesor Antonio Eiras 
Roel). Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 2003: 479-488.
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certainties that the triumphant social history had endorsed in the post-war decades, 
also those that constituted the marks of identity or the spirit of Annales. The decade 
would also end announcing the rise of new proposals and new paths that would 
grow in the 1980s and that, together with the old and more or less renovated paths, 
have made up the lush historiographic landscape in which we still move.
It was then, in the 1980s, when Jean-Philippe Genet took over from Strayer and 
Guenée (who had directed his thesis) to continue proposing a consideration of the 
political history of the final centuries of the Middle Ages from a state perspective, 
of the “genesis of the modern State” as we would now say. Naturally, this did not 
mean that there were no differences between these three historians. One need only 
mention the different consideration that they each gave to war as a factor in State 
development: as a curb or obstacle in Strayer’s case to the main stimulus and motor 
for Genêt, passing through the scant emphasis that Guenée gave to this question to 
say the least. Genet himself gives a dense account of his more complex and nuanced 
approach in the second half of the 90s, when he assesses the well-known and 
fruitful research programmes he encouraged, reviewing the very diverse traditions 
and fields of study that converge in his project, which, at the same time, reflected 
the plurality of independent routes characteristic of the historiography in the last 
two decades of the 20th century: Genet’s proposal was that of une histoire large 
(comparative et dans le long terme) du politique (l’État), ancrée profondément dans le social et 
l’èconomique (le féodalisme), étroitement liée à l’étude des acteurs sociaux (la prosopographie) 
et à l’histoire culturelle.46
However, what unites Strayer, Guenée and Genet is a shared ascription to a 
logic of state building when dealing with the political history of the 12th century 
onwards that is still nowadays a dominant paradigm, although not free of problems 
(as John Watts reminds us in his recent book) or of alternatives (as we shall see 
below). Of course, the mere use of the word State or the phrase “modern State” is 
not nowadays sufficient indication to share this paradigm. The lively debate about 
this question in recent decades, partly fostered by Genêt’s proposal, has meant that 
things are currently somewhat more complicated.47 That debate seems today to have 
mitigated a certain tendency in the 80-90s to generalize, which surely facilitates an 
assessment that is less contingent, more empirical and more focused. Of greater 
significance than the use of the noun State, alone or accompanied by the adjective 
modern or others, is the use of supposedly descriptive and neutral categories (or of 
contrasts whose value is assumed, like the very common one between public and 
private) which reveals the presence of the state logic, at least unilateral, as Watts 
46. “a broad history (comparative and in the long term) of the political (the State), anchored deeply in 
the social and economic (feudalism), closely linked to the study of the social actors (the prosopography) 
and cultural history”. Genet, Jean-Philippe. “La genèse de l’État moderne: Les enjeux d’un programme 
de recherche”. Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales, 118 (1997): 3-18, the quote on pp. 10-11.
47. I know no better approach to the trajectory traced by the notion of modern State in 20th-century 
historiography than the one offered by Benigno, Francesco. Las palabras del tiempo: un ideario para pensar 
históricamente. Madrid: Cátedra, 2013: 199-222.
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indicates, and which, by determining the questions, conditions the answers the 
sources are able to offer.
3. Jurisdictional political culture
In a way, Watts’ statement that, apart from French, Spanish historiography has 
been the most permeable to the interpretative framework centred on the “genesis 
of the modern State” proposed by Genet can come as a surprise.48 The surprise is 
due to the fact that from as early as 1960, related or relevant works in Spanish-
speaking territories can be identified that could have marked a different orientation 
and, ultimately, one closer to the posture that the English historian sustains. I am 
thinking about the latter work of Vicens Vives,49 or the “composite monarchies” of 
the Hispanist John Elliot,50 to cite two milestones that cover practically all the second 
half of the 20th century. However, it is true that both Vicens and Elliot concerned 
themselves with the 16th and 17th centuries; and effectively, it is precisely and perhaps 
paradoxically in the early-modernist historiography where critical or revisionist 
positions about the paradigm of the modern State, its logic and architecture, have 
been expressed more clearly and with more verve. As a result of this, and about 
the theme of war that concerns us here, Bartolomé Yun, for example, can state in 
a recent text, that in early modern Europe war was not always a condition for the 
development of States or fiscal regimes nor did all wars produce this effect.51
That the old regime’s political organization itself could be understood as a proper 
state-level organization is what others squarely question. Hence, Yun prefers to talk 
about “fiscal regimes”, and not “fiscal states”, before the 19th century. Hence, one can 
also sometimes garner the impression that the medievalists are pursuing a chimera, 
48. Evidence for this in Fuente, María Jesús. “El Estado ha muerto, ¡viva el Estado! Debates 
historiográficos sobre el Estado en la Edad Media”. Revista de Historiografía, 9 (2008): 33-49. See also, 
for contrast, the observations from the start of the same decade by García de Cortázar, José Ángel. 
“Elementos de definición de los espacios de poder en la Edad Media”, Los espacios de poder en la España 
medieval. XII Semana de Estudios Medievales (Nájera, 2001), José Ignacio de la Iglesia, José Luis Martín, 
coords. Logroño: Instituto de Estudios Riojanos, 2002: 13-46.
49. Vicens Vives, Jaime. “Estructura administrativa estatal en los siglos XVI y XVII”, Obra dispersa: España, 
América, Europa. Barcelona: Vicens-Vives, 1967: 359-377, also in Coyuntura económica y reformismo burgués. 
Barcelona: Ariel, 1969: 99-141. For the decisive impact of Vicens’ work had had on the change of course 
in the following years by the Italian historiography interested in this problem, including that focussed 
on the late Middle Ages, see Isaacs, Ann Katherine. “Twentieth Century Italian Historiography on the 
State in the Early Modern Period”, Public Power in Europe: Studies in Historical Transformations, James S. 
Amelang, Sigfried Beer, eds. Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2006: 17-38.
50. Elliot, John H. “A Europe of Composite Monarchies”. Past and Present, 137 (1992): 48-71, with a 
Spanish translation in Elliot, John H. España en Europa: Estudios de historia comparada. Valencia: Universitat 
de València, 2003: 65-91. And see also Elliot, John H. Haciendo historia. Madrid: Taurus, 2012, especially 
chapter 2.
51. Yun, Bartolomé. “Introduction: the rise of the fiscal state in Eurasia from a global, comparative and 
transnational perspective”, The Rise of Fiscal States: A Global History, 1500-1914, Bartolomé Yun, Patrick K. 
O’Brien, eds. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2012: 1-36.
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focussed on reconstructing the genesis of something whose reality is, in the best 
of cases, problematic. This is perhaps a perverse effect, the undesired consequence 
of an excess of chronological specialisation that not even the great collective work 
led by Genêt and Wim Blockmans between the 1980s and 90s managed to palliate, 
given that, as Jacques Krynen later mentioned, that work had allowed medievalists 
and early-modernists to work beside each other, but not together. Krynen added 
that le plus grand service que les médiévistes pourraient rendre au Moyen Age serait de cesser 
de faire exclusivement du Moyen Age... Il nous faut briser la chronologie... Se souvenir que 
Marc Bloch l’a fait, étudiant un miracle royal.52
In truth, until now, the early-modernists seem more sensitive to what should 
be contemplated as the historiographic consequences of the current crisis of the 
nation-state, and for that reason, more aware that this was not the inevitable fate 
or the obligatory end. They showed more willingness than the late-medievalists to 
explore the aptitudes and possibilities of a “political history without [a] State”,53 
although this could end up being less strange to the latter by only looking at the High 
Middle Ages and endeavouring not to see only chaos, arbitrariness or confusion, a 
panorama that would only have begun to change with the modernising impulse 
that would have meant the renaissance of the 12th century, also politically.
From the revisionist viewpoint, the 12th century marked a turning point with 
regard to political history anyway. However, it was not one that led to institutional 
development and growing state political culture, but rather to the deployment and 
configuration of an institutional complex and a jurisdictional political culture that, 
since the 1980s, has been brought to light by a renewed history of institutions whose 
leading representatives are from the countries of southern Europe and whose echo 
has also reached the early-modernists more than it has medievalists.
Whatever else, we have to thank these historians (primarily, but not only, 
legal historians) at least for having identified the issues accurately and raised the 
problems clearly, which is quite something in a terrain where the conceptual 
vagueness of some approaches had, for a long time, no alternative but the deductive 
theoretical elaborations of others. In contrast, the jurisdictional model or paradigm 
has been built looking to the conceptual universe and the argumentative rhetoric of 
the sources themselves, and thus addressed through their own discursive context. 
Among these, the ones that should be considered of a doctrinal nature (a not very 
theoretical doctrine, but very attached to the praxis, in which that world was also 
very different from ours) were the result of that “mysterious science” as Edward 
Gibbon contemptuously dismissed it, in other words, of the science of law in its 
52. “the best the medievalists can do for the Middle Ages would be to stop doing exclusively the 
Middle Ages... We must thwart the chronology... Remember that Marc Bloch has done so studying a real 
miracle”. Krynen, Jacques. “La souveraineté royale”, Les tendances actuelles de l’histoire du Moyen Âge en 
France et en Allemagne, Jean-Claude Schmitt, Otto Gerhard Oexle dirs. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 
2002: 299-302.
53. Schaub, Jean-Frédéric. “L’histoire politique sans l’État: mutations et reformulations”, Historia a debate, 
Carlos Barros ed. Santiago de Compostela: Xunta de Galicia, 1995: III, 217-235; García Monerris, Carme; 
García Monerris, Encarna. “Fragmentos de Monarquía: La possibilitat d’una història política sense estat”. 
Recerques: història, economía i cultura, 32 (1995): 103-111.
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ius commune stage, a science whose origins can be traced back precisely to the 
12th century54 and which was developed from the study of, at times, centuries-
old material, ancient reports and norms which, envueltas en farragosos volúmenes 
de privados y oscuros intérpretes, forman aquella tradición de opiniones que en gran parte 
de Europa tiene todavía el nombre de leyes, as the Milanese Cesare Beccaria, a close 
contemporary of Gibbon, also wrote.55 “[The] dregs of the most barbarous ages”, 
as the latter concluded. It was the mentality of the Enlightenment, whose laudable 
aims also served to cement the wall of misunderstanding, if not of oblivion, that 
would subsequently rise between that world and modern historiography.
It was left to late medieval and early modern scientia iuris to ascertain and organize 
the complex and ever-evolving problematic fabric of overlapping and mutually 
adapting powers that coexisted in the same territories. And it is by virtue of that 
mission that the law of the time can today be considered the most suitable (being 
the most direct) approach to the composition, characteristics and logic of that fabric. 
It might be objected, perhaps, that its proponents’ elaborations are but a construct, 
to which it could be answered that it is but the necessary theoretical framework 
that, explicitly or implicitly, also underlies any reconstruction and historical 
analysis. Unlike the assumptions and deductions many historiographic works rely 
on, however, some of the most salient features of the jurists’ activity during the 
period under consideration —above all, their course of action, not systematic but 
case-based and topical, as well as their purpose, not directly normative, in the sense 
that their resolutions were not necessarily binding, even less final, but rather simply 
shaping the communis opinio (the prevailing opinion among experts, always open to 
contradiction)— make it preferable to consider the results of that activity as the best 
way today para entender, a su través, las prácticas y el ejercicio del poder.56 In this respect, 
it is worth recalling the words of Patrick Geary, nearly thirty years ago:
54. Quaglioni, Diego. “Introduzione. La rinovazione del diritto”, Il secolo XII: la “renovatio” dell’Europa 
cristiana, Giles Constable, Giorgio Cracco, Hagen Keller, Diego Quaglioni, eds. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2003: 
17-34.
55. “wrapped in cumbersome volumes of private and dark interpreters, they make up that tradition 
of opinion that still has the name of laws in much of Europe”. Pardos, Julio A. “El mundo nuevo del 
derecho”, Historia de Europa, Miguel Artola, dir. Madrid: Espasa, 2007: I, 796-804. The quote from Gibbon 
is from the last paragraph of chapter 44 of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Romen Empire; the one 
by Beccaria, from the first paragraph of Dei delitti e delle pene. I cannot resist adding another expressive 
judgement that the Justinian compilation merited from another contemporary, the Napolitan jurist 
Gaetano Filangieri, author of La scienza della legislazione: these were “leggi d’un popolo prima libero e poi 
sciavo, compilate da un giureconsulto perverso sotto un Imperatore imbecille” (“laws of a people first free, then 
enslaved, compiled by a perverse jurisconsult under an imbecile of an Emperor”), cited by Lazzarich, 
Diego; Borrelli, Gianfranco. “I Borbone a San Leucio: un esperimento di polizia cristiana”, Alle origini di 
Minerva trionfante: Caserta e l’utopia di S. Leucio: la costruzione dei siti reali borbonici, Imma Ascione, Giuseppe 
Cirillo, Gian Maria Piccinelli, eds. Rome: Ministero per i beni e le attività culturali: Direzione generale per 
gli archivi, 2012: 345-372, specially 347.
56. “to understand, through them, the practice and exercise of power”. Vallejo, Jesús. “El príncipe ante 
el derecho en la cultura del ius commune”, Manual de historia del derecho. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2012: 
152. The same author introduces in the best way imaginable the modes of reasoning and argumentation 
of the jurists of the ius commune in “Derecho como cultura: equidad y orden desde la óptica del ius 
commune”, Historia de la propiedad: patrimonio cultural. III Encuentro interdisciplinar (Salamanca, mayo 2002), 
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Les médiévistes doivent commencer à élaborer d’autres schémas conceptuels et les plus 
utiles, à nos yeux, se truvent dans la riqche littérature, souvent pleine de contradictions, de 
l’anthropologie juridique. Les historiens du Moyen Age ne sont, en aucun cas, les premiers 
à découvrir les sociétés aux prises avec des conflits et de diffèrends à résoudre sans l’aide 
d’institutions juridiques centralisés et impersonnelles qui soient capables de rendre des 
verdicts définitifs et de les faire respecter. Des telles sociétés sont nombreuses mais, si l’Europe 
médiévale diffère radicalement du monde des Barotse du Nord Zimbabwe ou des kung 
Bushmen du kalahari expérience des anthropologues qui étudient la fa on dont ces sociétés 
traitent les tensions sociales peut nous permettre élaborer des concepts pour comprendre 
Europe médiévale.57
Why not start simply by dealing with concepts from the sources themselves, 
without translations that end up being misleading? For this, it is worth taking into 
consideration the medieval and early modern idea of law. Law was not then an 
expression of power, but rather legal order (ordenamiento), social emanation and not 
a political imposition, to sum up, auto-organizzazione prima che norma as Paolo Grossi 
has insisted.58 There was neither confusion between ius and lex nor a monopoly on its 
production, as would occur much later with the arrival of the State. The normative 
force of law, which it had, did not come about so much through the legislative path 
but was more jurisprudential and doctrinal. Then the law was, in short, a reality 
Salustiano de Dios, Javier Infante, Ricardo Robledo, Eugenia Torijano, coords. Madrid: Centro de 
Estudios Registrales, 2003: 53-70. See also Viehweg, Theodor. Tópica y jurisprudencia. Madrid: Taurus, 
1964, 1986; Hespanha, António Manuel de. “Early Modern Law and the Anthropological Imagination 
of Old European Culture”, Early Modern History and the Social Sciences: Testing the Limits of the Braudel’s 
Mediterranean, John A. Marino, ed. Kirksville: Truman State University Press, 2001: 191-204, maxime 201 
and following.
57. “The medievalists must begin to draw up other conceptual schemes, and to our way of thinking, the 
most useful are to be found in the rich literature, often full of contradictions, of legal anthropology. In no 
case are the historians of the Middle Ages the first to discover societies that have to resolve their conflicts 
and differences without the help of centralised legal institutions in a position to issue and enforce final 
verdicts. Such societies abound, but while medieval Europe differs radically from the world of the Barotse 
of Northern Zimbabwe or the Bushmen of the Kalahari, the experience of anthropologists studying how 
these companies manage social tensions can enable us to develop concepts for understanding medieval 
Europe”. Geary, Patrick J. “Vivre en conflit dans une France sans État: typologie des mécanismes de 
règlement des conflits (1050-1200)”. Annales. Économies Sociétés. Civilisations, 41/5 (1986): 1107-1133 
(especially 1109-1110).
58. “self-organisation rather than norm“. Grossi, Paolo. Il diritto tra potere e ordinamento. Naples: Editoriale 
Scientifica, 2005: 9. The essential reference here is obviously Grossi, Paolo. L’ordine giuridico medievale. 
Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995, but also take advantage of other works by the author now conveniently 
collected in the anthology Paolo Grossi, ed. Guido Alpa. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2011, especially 
“Ordinamento” (46-57), “Un diritto senza Stato (la nozione di autonomia come fondamento della 
costituzione giuridica medievale)” (66-82) and “Dalla società di società alla insularità dello Stato: fra 
Medioevo ed Età moderna” (88-107). The far from unambiguous term ordinamento (and its Spanish 
derivation ordenamiento) is deep-rooted in the juridical traditions of a number of continental European 
nations, but only recently incorporated into others such as the English, where it is habitually translated as 
“legal order”. In this respect, see Itzcovich, Giulio. “Legal Order, Legal Pluralism, Fundamental Principles. 
Europe and Its Law in Three Concepts”. European Law Journal, 18/3 (2012): 358-384. For Grossi’s usage 
of the term ordinamento, indebted to Santi Romano’s institutionalism, see Locchi, Maria Chiara. “Brief 
reflections on legal pluralism as a key paradigm of contemporary law in highly differentiated western 
societies”. Revista Brasileira de Direito, 10/2 (2014), 74-84.
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prior to power. This is the perspective that Grossi has emphasised as necessary to 
understand the pre-contemporary legal order and this is, however, not usually even 
suspected by a mentality like ours, forged on the idea that power necessarily has 
to precede the law. This could undoubtedly be used in its own benefit, but the 
production of law was not a vital function of power prior to the appearance of the 
State, the creation and establishment of the former was not part of the physiology 
of the latter, as would happen at a later stage of European history with the advent 
of the state subject. Thus the medieval and current conceptions of law (at least the 
dominant ones in the latter case) are not comparable with each other. This means 
that, without careful translation, the categories of each conception are totally 
inadequate, if not aberrant, for explaining one through the other.
Regarding the historiographic practice, an important consequence of the above is 
that law understood as legal order, in the sense thus defined, is not identified with a 
reductive and simplistic vision of social complexity, like that which tends to endorse 
the statist conception of law typical of legal positivism and informed the old, 19th-
century history of institutions, rightfully maligned in the 20th century by social 
historians, very especially by medievalists. On the contrary, that understanding 
expresses that complexity in the legal pluralism and the pullulare di ordinamenti59 
it gives rise to and which is a fundamental fact at the basis of the jurisdictionalist 
perspective of the medieval and early modern societies.
However, the law was no more than one, and not the most important, of the many 
devices destined to guarantee order in those societies. United inextricably to law (or 
even above the law in cases of conflict with it), religion, then socially equipped with 
its full prescriptive power, also fulfilled this task.60 Crime was then no more serious 
than sin.61 In fact, at first, they were indistinguishable, and the primacy of religion 
meant a conception of order, of social order thus integrated into the natural order, 
as something preceding the law and unavailable to this. Law was not then seen as 
creating order; it was only used to make this order clear.62 Its position was assuredly 
subordinate, because love of God and one’s neighbour (charity, theological virtue) 
prevailed or should prevail in its social consideration over justice (cardinal virtue), 
although the latter was also identified with the Creator and Supreme Judge. That is 
59. “proliferation of legal orders”. Grossi, Paolo. “Ordinamento...”: 54.
60. Still essential for these questions, Clavero, Bartolomé. Antidora: antropología católica de la economía 
moderna. Milan: Giuffrè, 1991; Clavero, Bartolomé. “Beati dictum: derecho de linaje, economía de familia 
y cultura de orden”. Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español, 63-64 (1993-1994): 7-148.
61. With different viewpoints: Clavero, Bartolomé. “Delito y pecado: noción y escala de transgresiones”, 
Sexo barroco y otras transgresiones premodernas, Francisco Tomás, coord. Madrid: Alianza, 1990: 57-89; Prodi, 
Paolo. Una storia della giustizia: dal pluralismo dei fori al moderno dualismo tra coscienza e diritto. Bologna: Il 
Mulino, 2000; Morin, Alejandro. “Pecado e individuo en el marco de una antropología cristiana medieval”. 
Bulletin du Centre d’études médiévales d’Auxerre, Hors série 2. (2008) <http://cem.revues.org/9552>.
62. Petit, Carlos; Vallejo, Jesús. “La categoria giuridica nella cultura europea del Medioevo”, Storia 
d’Europa. 3. Il Medioevo: secoli V-XV, Gherardo Ortalli, ed. Turin: Einaudi, 1994: 721-760; Hespanha, 
António Manuel. Cultura jurídica europea: síntesis de un milenio. Madrid: Tecnos, 2002: 58 and following; 
Hespanha, António Manuel. “As cores e a instituição da ordem no mundo do antigo regime”. Phronesis: 
Revista do Curso de Direito da FEAD, 6 (2010): 9-24.
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the reason for the frequent presence in our sources, including the sources of practice 
or social documents, of a language of love and lovelessness, which historians have 
not always taken seriously or have even ignored, uncomfortable with a vocabulary 
that seemed to be a remnant of naivety. This was especially so if it was expressed 
in the vernacular, in other words, once Western Europe had taken the supposedly 
irreversible path to institutional modernity, even thought the reality could seem 
contradictory.
The same vocabulary in its Latin version and in documents from the High Middle 
Ages was less surprising. Amor and amicitia could appear in these, concerning the 
most serious questions and without embarrassing the historian, with their own 
semantic and figurative load, since not for nothing were the writers often men of the 
Church, devoted to God; but this was also because this was prior to the beginnings of 
said modernity. It was then concluded that, on the basis of the moral value of (more 
or less ritualized) love and friendship, ways of solving conflicts could efficiently 
be developed which would eventually be made obsolete by the development and 
imposition of increasingly stable and rational legal institutions and of ever more 
centralized dependency. The post-Carolingian guerrae were settled, not with the 
simple establishment of a neutral peace, but rather with the reestablishment of the 
amor between the sides in the conflict through the voluntary action as arbiters or 
mediators of pairs of opponents. As is known, this was the subject of the above-
mentioned well-known article by Patrick Geary, then the spokesperson for a 
historiographic current which has come to be called the “American School” in the 
study of medieval conflicts and social order.63 The title of one of the first emblematic 
texts in this current resorted to an apothegm contained in the Leges Henrici Primi, 
a compilation drawn up in England in the early 12th century: Pactum legem vincit et 
amor iudicium.64 Nowadays we know, however, of the lasting validity of the principle 
that supported such a legal axiom, a validity not only limited to the High Middle 
Ages, but lasting throughout all the Middle Ages65 and beyond.66 The love referred 
63. Conflict in Medieval Europe: Changing Perspectives on Society and Culture, Warren C. Brown, Piotr Górecky, 
eds. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003.
64. White, Stephen D. “Pactum... Legem Vincit et Amor Judicium: The Settlement of Disputes by Compromise 
in Eleventh-Century Western France”. The American Journal of Legal History, 22 (1978): 281-308, now also 
in White, Stephen D. Feuding and Peace-Making in Eleventh-Century France. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005.
65. Clanchy, Michael. “Law and Love in the Middle Ages”, Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human 
Relations in the West, John Bossy, ed. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1983: 47-67; Roebuck, 
Derek. Mediation and Arbitration in the Middle Ages: England 1154 to 1558. Oxford: Holo Books, 2013; Smail, 
Daniel Lord. “Telling Tales in Angevin Courts”. French Historical Studies, 20/2 (1997): 183-215; id. The 
Consumption of Justice: Emotions, Publicity, and Legal Culture in Marseille, 1264-1423. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2003; Vallejo, Jesús. “Amor de árbitros: episodio de le sucesión de Per Afán de Ribera el Viejo”, 
Fallstudien zur spanischen und portugiesischen Justiz: 15. bis 20. Jahrhundert, Johannes-Michael Scholz, ed. 
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994: 211-269.
66. Bossy, John. “Postscript”, Disputes and Settlements: Law and Human Relations in the West, John Bossy, 
ed. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1983: 287-293; Hespanha, António Manuel. La gracia 
del derecho: economía de la cultura en la Edad Moderna. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993: 
maxime chap. 1; Raggio, Osvaldo. “Visto dalla periferia. Formazioni politiche di antico regime e Stato 
moderno”, Storia d’Europa. 4. L’età moderna: secoli XVI-XVIII, Maurice Aymard, ed. Turin: Einaudi, 1995: 
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to should be understood not so much as a subjective mood but more as an objective 
reality, in the same sense that colours are thought of not so much as a perception 
of the subject, but more as a quality of the objects. Love is affection, inclination, 
yes, but it must not submit to the will, which is potencia ciega. ¿Qué se puede esperar 
de un hombre que tiene más respeto a lo que su voluntad inclina que a lo que la ley de 
Dios le obliga?67. It was not the viewpoint of the subject, of the individual, that was 
then privileged socially and institutionally to negotiate and integrate itself into the 
world.68 For him to control his own life —to use a common expression today—, it 
would have been necessary to abolish the ordenamiento compuesto,69 at the same time 
religious and legal, in which he was previously immersed.
In its various specific manifestations, the European social and political order of 
the 12th through the 18th centuries was, in effect, not a compound of individuals 
but one of persons. Persons who could be identified with individuals, but were 
not to be mistaken for them; who could be multiplied within a single individual; 
or require a plurality of them to be constituted, on the other hand. Individuals, in 
short, were no more than players of one or more roles; and it was the latter, not the 
former, who held rights and duties, or rather, privileges and functions. The former 
(the privileges) were expressions of diversity and inequality, and the individuals 
shared in these, not as such, but rather because of their status or social condition, 
that is to say, the role or roles they could play, as these roles could also vary, in 
either time or space. These were the only states (understood as status) existing then. 
The latter —the functions— responded to an idea of unity that was not equivalent 
to homogeneity, but rather of an ideally harmonic aggregate of heterogeneous 
fragments. These were pieces or fragments that, at the same time as they pursued 
their own aims, contributed to the ordered working of the whole they formed 
part of. Only in these cases, persons were identified with a body, to the point of 
becoming it, not a material body but a mystical one, just as the Church was said 
to be a corpus mysticum. It was, then, an immaterial and immortal body, originated 
either in a succession of individuals with the same dignity or in a coeval plurality of 
them in a corporation. And society as a whole, made up of those bodies and with 
483-527; Niccoli, Ottavia. Perdonare: idee, pratiche, rituali tra Cinque e Seicento. Rome-Bari: Laterza: 2007; 
Stringere la pace: teorie e pratiche della conciliazione nell’Europa moderna (secoli XV-XVIII), ed. Paolo Broggio, 
Maria Pia Paoli. Rome: Viella, 2011; The Charitable Arbitrator: How to Mediate and Arbitrate in Louis XIV’s 
France, ed. Derek Roebuck. Oxford: Holo Books, 2002; Garriga, Carlos. “Sobre el gobierno de la justicia 
en Indias (siglos XVI-XVII)”. Revista de Historia del Derecho, 34 (2006): 67-160, especially 143.
67. Covarrubias, Sebastián de. “Voluntad”, Tesoro de la lengua castellana, o española. Madrid: Luis Sánchez 
impresor, 1611: 76v. And see Hespanha, António Manuel. “La senda amorosa del derecho: amor y iustitia 
en el discurso jurídico moderno”, Pasiones del jurista: amor, memoria, melancolía, imaginación, Carlos Petit, 
ed. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1997: 23-56; Hespanha, António Manuel. “Early 
Modern Law and the Anthropological Imagination...”; Hespanha, António Manuel de. “As cores e a 
instituiçao da ordem...”.
68. Alessi, Giorgia. Il soggetto e l’ordine: percorsi dell’individualismo nell’Europa moderna. Turin: Giappichelli, 
2006; Clavero, Bartolomé. Happy Constitution: cultura y lengua constitucionales. Madrid: Trotta, 1997: 11-40.
69. “composite order”. Clavero, Bartolomé. “Beati dictum...”: 119. Some convergence can now be 
appreciated, at least in the approach, in Fletcher, Christopher; Oates, Rosamund. “Afterword: Religious 
Thought, Political Practices, 1200-1600”. Cultural and Social History, 6/3 (2009): 297-304.
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each of them playing their appointed parts, could be conceived after that organicist 
pattern (this would become an iconographic as well as a discursive motif, as is well 
known) and also imagined as a body, that is, as a person. It was these persons then, 
with a body and of different importance, who shaped that political and social order. 
About the single individual, not being a person as such, the only socially relevant 
element was his soul.70
It should be added that this corporate composition, as it is customary to say (with 
the risk, however, of misunderstandings), was considered part of a natural order 
and, therefore, unavailable to any political power, for whom the multiplicity of 
bodies and the relative autonomy of each of them was an irreducible fact. The 
corporations that, like the cities, had a territorial base, together with the seigneurial 
entities, could thus survive as political subjects throughout the time of validity of 
that conception of order, not as vestiges or remains from a certain moment, but 
rather as consubstantial elements of the same.
On the other hand, a feature of that way of understanding the social and 
political order, in which the autonomy of the pieces that made up the whole is 
concerned, was their recognized ability to provide their own legal order, with the 
result that, from this point of view, the whole was a complex mosaic or a far from 
homogeneous aggregate of iura propria. And this was the most visible manifestation 
of the iurisdictio that, to a varying extent, was recognised equally as consubstantial 
to each body (corpus, societas, communitas, universitas, civitas, respublica...) and that was 
exercised by its head (pars principans). Jurisdiction (iurisdictio and its semantic field 
in that context, not in ours) was the word that then effectively designated political 
power.71 The holder was the person who held jurisdiction, each in his own field, 
but without any hierarchy being able or empowered to suspend or annul what 
corresponded to each within his own sphere. The consequence can be no other 
than an understanding of the political framework as a constellation of republics, 
constantly obliged because of the circumstances to negotiate the composition of 
the whole, this being the expression of polycentrism that then characterised the 
possession and exercise of political power.
Iurisdictio is first and foremost judicial power, and its holder is primarily the judge, 
whose activity is mainly focussed on resolving conflicts, giving to each his due (suum 
cuique tribuere, as the definition of justice states in the Digesto by Ulpianus and that 
Thomas Aquinas would make his own), in other words, ensuring that each one 
was in his corresponding place within the pre-established order, the natural order 
of things. However, iurisdictio was also regulatory power, understood as the power 
70. Clavero, Bartolomé. Tantas personas como estados: por una antropología política de la historia europea. 
Madrid: Tecnos, 1986; Clavero, Bartolomé. “Almas y cuerpos: sujetos del derecho en la Edad moderna”. 
Studi in memoria di Giovanni Tarello, 1. Milan: Giuffrè, 1990: 153-171; Hespanha, Antonio Manuel. “Early 
Modern Law and the Anthropological Imagination...”: 193 and following.
71. The fundamental reference here has to be to none other than Costa, Pietro. Iurisdictio: semantica 
del potere politico nella pubblicistica medievale (1100-1433). Milan: Giuffrè, 1969, 2002; and, in his wake, 
Vallejo, Jesús. Ruda equidad, ley consumada: concepción de la potestad normativa, 1250-1350. Madrid: Centro 
de Estudios Constitucionales, 1992.
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to interpret, adapt and specify this same natural order in precise circumstances, 
not as a prerogative to create a new order ex novo. Thus, it corresponded to the 
holder of the iurisdictio to ensure the maintenance and conservation of an order 
that preceded him and proceed to restore this in case it was violated, and always 
doing so in line with the requirements and guarantees of a procedural act. Hence, it 
has been possible to talk about a medieval-origin concepción panjudicial del gobierno,72 
or rappresentazione giustiziale del potere73 that survived throughout the early modern 
period. Only by resorting on exceptional, justified and equally regulated occasions, 
to the potestas absoluta accorded in European kingdoms of the time to the incumbent 
of highest jurisdiction, was the latter able to rule without abiding by the judicial 
guidelines governing his habitual conduct and course of action; and only by also 
appealing to their domestic potestas oeconomica, by virtue of the republic being 
likened to a household (the social order’s basic cell, subject to the pater familias’ 
discretionary power) were the holders of jurisdiction entitled to act without the 
restrictions of its exercise.
Very briefly, these were the conceptions and values that sustained the social and 
institutional order prior to the revolutions that led to the world that maybe we still 
live in.74 Put differently, those concepts and values informed the basic structures 
that supported the construction and working of the political entities and regimes 
that really existed then.75 These are, in short, the conceptions and values that 
encouraged the main rules of the game with which the various competing interests 
then faced each other and settled their differences. As can be seen, these rules and 
conceptions were very different from ours. Originally deployed at the height of 
the Middle Ages —12th and 13th centuries—, they would remain uncontested, 
practically and substantially, until the 18th, even though, today, we could identify 
in retrospect certain earlier theoretical elaborations (more or less developed) which 
only after that date, however, worked their way through and found a practical 
application. However, one should not be carried away by this genetic or genealogical 
perspective, a frequent cause, not only of anachronistic readings of the sources, but 
rather of applying a selection process to these (otherwise inevitable in the work of 
the historian) that tends to have the perverse effect of decontextualising these and 
72. “panjudicial conception of government”. Mannori, Luca. “Justicia y Administración entre Antiguo y 
Nuevo Régimen”. Revista Jurídica de la Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 15 (2007): 125-146: 135.
73. “judicial image of power”. Mannori, Luca. Bernardo Sordi. Storia del diritto administrativo. Rome- 
Bari: Laterza, 2001: 38.
74. Excellent summaries with which to complete or correct if necessary what is presented here are 
offered by Garriga, Carlos. “Orden jurídico y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen”, Cádiz, 1812: la 
constitución jurisdiccional, Carlos Garriga, Marta Lorente, eds. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y 
Constitucionales, 2007: 43-72; Agüero, Alejandro. “Las categorías básicas de la cultura jurisdiccional”. 
Cuadernos de derecho judicial (2006) 6: 19-58; Costa, Pietro. “Il diritto nell’Europa moderna: strumenti e 
strategie”, L’etá moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII): Culture, religioni, saperi, Roberto Bizzocchi, ed. (Storia Política e 
del Mediterraneo, Alessandro Barbero, dir., vol. 11). Rome: Salerno Editrice, 2011: 415-456; Vallejo, Jesús. 
“El príncipe ante el derecho...”.
75. For all, see Benedictis, Angela de. Politica, governo e istituzioni nell’Europa moderna. Bologna: Il Mulino, 
2001.
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thus depriving them of their own logic. As far as genesis is concerned, it is only that 
of the sources themselves that must not be evaded for a correct and more fertile 
understanding.
However, whereas those rules of the game were not challenged until the date 
indicated and their liquidation was the result of revolutionary processes generally 
not free from violence, their application did not occur pacifically and smoothly 
either. Indeed, their own validity was always subject to confrontation with practices 
that were, in principle, alien, and the way of dealing with war provides a good 
example of this. Let us see this quickly and succinctly.
4. War
In the penultimate decade of the 14th century, the canonist Honorat Bovet wrote 
his famous Arbre des batailles, a work that has been called una auténtica enciclopedia de 
la caballería,76 and also a verdadero compendio del arte de la guerra and —what interests 
us more here— an auténtico tratado sobre derecho bélico.77 A Doctor in Decrees from the 
University of Avignon and prior of a small Benedictine establishment in Selonnet, in 
Upper Provence, Bovet is not thought of, however, as someone dedicated to studies 
and the contemplative life. His desire to intervene in the political and religious affairs 
surrounding the Western Schism is not only behind his works, but also seems to 
have led him to be an active member of Charles VI’s close circle; it is to King Charles 
that the Arbre is dedicated. The fact that today almost a hundred manuscript copies 
have survived and that the work was the subject of nine printed editions between 
1477 and 1515 gives an idea of its extraordinary spread. Written in the vernacular 
and soon translated into other vernacular languages, it can be said that it was a 
work of dissemination of doctrine on war as it had crystallized in the first phase of 
maturity of the ius commune. The imprint of Bartolo da Sassoferrato and Giovanni da 
Legnano (the author of the first real de bello treatise barely thirty years earlier) can 
easily be traced in Bovet’s work. Habitually found in noble libraries all over Europe, 
in Castile, just before the mid 14th century, Íñigo López de Mendoza and Álvaro de 
Luna did not hesitate to agree on one thing: to commission translations of a book 
tan leido por los caballeros como una autoridad sobre las leyes de la guerra.78 In one of these 
76. “an authentic encyclopaedia of chivalry”, Gómez Moreno, Ángel. “La militia clásica y la caballería 
medieval: las lecturas de re militari entre Medievo y Renacimiento”. Evphrosyne: Revista de Filologia Clássica, 
23 (1995): 83-97: 96.
77. “true compendium of the art of war”; “authentic treatise on the law of armed conflict”. For both 
remarks: Contreras, Antonio. “Estudio introductorio” Honoré de Bouvet, Árbol de batallas: versión 
castellana atribuida a Diego de Valera, ed. Antonio Contreras. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2008: 13-
29. The attribution of this Spanish translation to Diego de Valera is dubious. Against this opinion, for 
example: Velasco, Jesús R. El debate sobre la caballería en el siglo XV: la tratadística caballeresca castellana en su 
marco europeo. Valladolid: Junta de Castilla y León, 1996: 116-119, 221-222, 392-393.
78. “So widely read by knights as an authority on the laws of war”. Keen, Maurice. La caballería. 
Barcelona: Ariel, 1986: 308. For this, simply refer also to: Biu, Hélène. La traduction occitane de l’Arbre 
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translations, the one commissioned by the Constable of Castile, we can read the 
following under the heading “Si otro príncipe qu’el Enperador puede ordenar guerra”:
Aquí conviene que sepamos si los otros príncipes pueden mandar hazer guerra. E yo vos 
respondo que sí, según derecho; mas otra presona no puede mandar hazer guerra. E la razón 
es que non pueden ni deve ninguno traer armas sin licencia del príncipe. E ay otra razón, 
que ninguno no puede ni deve tomar derecho de otro si le á hecho tuerto; mas conviene qu’el 
principe le haga justicia. Mas el día de oy cada uno manda hazer guerra, lo cual de derecho 
hazer no se deve.79
The text clearly expresses the growing restriction of the concept of war that 
would be imposed on a culture modelled by the European ius commune. Only the 
prince, the individual or collective person that holds the maximum iurisdictio and 
does not acknowledge a higher instance, can declare war; therefore, one can only 
speak authoritatively of wars when they are declared and led by the prince.
That said, liable to contradiction and with its application subject to a 
jurisprudential (not legal) regime, that doctrine, in the end an opinion, but a 
qualified one, extracting all its authority and normative force from endless exegesis 
and commentary of revered texts as well as from the degree of consensus about 
them, would not be entirely peaceful until the late 16th century, in a context torn 
by the wars of religion.80 And the attitude of the jurists had an exact parallel among 
the theologians. While, in his famous formula about the three requisites a war had 
to comply with to be considered just, Thomas Aquinas had reserved the first place 
for the auctoritas principis, so that the potestas bellandi only corresponded licitly to 
him,81 nearly three centuries later, Francisco de Vitoria, after developing a wider 
and more inclusive concept of war than Aquinas’, where the prince had exclusive 
des batailles de Honorat Bovet. Paris: École Nationale de Chartes (PhD Dissertation), 2000 <http://
theses.enc.sorbonne.fr/2000/biu>; Álvarez, M. Carmen. “La biblioteca de Don Fadrique Enríquez de 
Ribera, I Marqués de Tarifa (1532)”. Historia. Instituciones. Documentos, 13 (1986): 1-40; Çeçen, Zeynep 
K. Interpreting Warfare and knighthood in Late Medieval France: Writers and their Sources in the Reign of king 
Charles VI (1380-1422). Ankara: Bilkent University (PhD Dissertation), 2012 <http://www.academia.
edu/2104902>; Taylor, Craig. Chivalry and the Ideals of knighthood in France during the Hundred Years War. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2013.
79. “Here it is worth us knowing if the other princes can order war to be made. And I answer you that 
yes, according to law; no other person can order war to be made. And the reason is that they cannot nor 
should not carry arms without permission of the prince. And there is another reason, that no-one can 
nor should take revenge against he who injures him, but it is necessary for the prince to impose justice. 
Currently, every one wages war against everyone else, which is against the law and must not be done.” 
Árbol de batallas: versión castellana...: 86.
80. Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine de la guerre juste. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 
1983: 134 and following. See also Quaglioni, Diego. “Pour une histoire du droit de guerre au début de 
l’âge moderne: Bodin, Gentili, Grotius”. Laboratoire italien, 10 (2010): 27-43 (with an Italian version in 
Teatri di guerra: rappresentazioni e discorsi tra età moderna ed età contemporanea, Angela De Benedictis, Clizia 
Magoni, eds. Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2010: 29-42), emphasising how war will continue to 
be thought of in legal terms and assimilating it to a legal process, in perfect consonance with the way of 
understanding political power essentially as iurisdictio.
81. Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine...: 122 and following; Russell, Frederick H. The Just War in 
the Middle Ages. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 1975: 267 and following.
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rights only to a war of aggression (since the prince is the legitimate holder of an 
authority that resides in the communitas or respublica perfecta he presides over), still 
elaborates with numerous examples for the sake of clarity:
Ex quibus sequitur, quod alii reguli seu principes, qui non praesunt rei publicae, non possunt 
bellum inferre aut gerere, quemadmodum dux Albanus aut comes Beneventanus. Sunt enim 
partes regni Castellae et per consequens non habent perfectas res publicas, sed truncatas. 
Sed est notandum, quod cum haec sint magna ex parte aut iure gentium aut humano, 
consuetudo potest dare facultatem belli gerendi. Unde si quae civitas aut princeps obtinuit 
antiqua consuetudine ius gerendi per se bellum, non est ei neganda haec auctoritas, etiam 
si alias non esset res publica perfecta. Item etiam necessitas hanc licentiam et auctoritatem 
concedere posset.82
Hardly a decade after the death of Thomas Aquinas and culminating what could 
be called the purposeful movement to develop coutumiers that arose in France during 
the 13th century, Philippe de Beaumanoir wrote Li livres des coustumes et des usages de 
Beauvoisins,83 whose chapter LIX was dedicated precisely to wars, comment guerre se 
fet et comment guerre faut, in reality a compilation of the customary rules that covered 
the droit de guerre recognised to the gentius hommes, i.e. the nobles, car autre que gentil 
homme ne pueent guerroier.84 Even with this restriction, the contrast with the position 
of Doctor Angelicus could not be clearer, and the difference was in the custom, the 
same factor that, two and a half centuries later, was enough for Francisco de Vitoria 
to consider the resort to war by the initiative of the non-sovereign civitas aut princeps 
licit.85 Although a theologian, Vitoria did not restrict his choice of authorities, 
and like other specialists in his field, he appealed to the Fathers of the Church 
and the Philosopher together with such other renowned jurists as Bartolus and 
Panormitanus in his argumentation about what authority was competent to declare 
and wage war, an argumentation headed by a quotation from the Digest. Indeed, 
in the culture forged by these jurists, custom was not below the law86; both were 
regarded as the revelation of an identical, unalterable order.
82. Vitoria, Francisco de. De iure belli, Carlo Galli, ed. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2005: 24 (II, 3).
83. Beaumanoir, Philippe de. Coutumes de Beauvaisis, ed. Amédée Salmon, Paris: Picard, 1899. A 
comparative approach to the Coutumes in Miller, Samuel J.T. “The Position of the King in Bracton and 
Beaumanoir”. Speculum, 31/2 (1956): 263-296; and biographically in Lécuyer, Sylvie. “Un idéal social, 
politique et religieux transmis de père en fils: du roman de Jehan et Blonde aux Coutumes de Beauvaisis”. 
Revue des Langues Romanes, 1 (2000): 129-142.
84. “How the war is done and how it must be done”, “the law of war”, “only knights and nobles can 
wage war”. Beaumanoir, Philippe de. Coutumes de Beauvaisis...: II, 357. See also the contemporary episode, 
offered as an example in Bordier, Henri Léonard. Philippe de Remi, sire de Beaumanoir, jurisconsulte et poëte 
national du Beauvaisis, 1246-1296. Paris: Librairie Techener, 1869: 81-93.
85. The idea of sovereignty must be understood here in the only sense for that time: the person who 
held it was exempt from the judgment of another, that is, not subject to a higher iurisdictio. Costa, Pietro. 
“La soberanía en la cultura político-jurídica medieval: imágenes y teorías”. Res publica, 17 (2007): 33-58.
86. Petit, Carlos; Vallejo, Jesús. “La categoria giuridica”...: 748-749; and with more technical forcefulness: 
Vallejo, Jesús. Ruda equidad, ley consumada...
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Mas el día de oy cada uno manda hazer guerra, lo cual de derecho hazer no se deve.87 
Remember that this is how the fragment of the Árbol de batallas mentioned above 
ended. Honorat Bovet undoubtedly tacitly left there his testimony about the wars 
that ravaged Provence after the death of Queen Joanna of Naples in 1382. It is a 
shame that nowadays we have no critical edition of the Arbre, as it would also be 
worth comparing the text of the Castilian translation we have been dealing with (A) 
with the French. Let us do so anyway with the two version of the latter: the only 
existing modern edition, already long in the tooth and based on a manuscript from 
1456 from the Royal Library of Belgium88 (B), and an incunable form from 1493 
kept in the National Library of France89 (C):
A.
Si otro príncipe qu’el Enperador 
puede ordenar guerra.
Aquí conviene que sepamos si los 
otros príncipes pueden mandar 
hazer guerra. E yo vos respondo 
que sí, según derecho; mas otra 
presona no puede mandar hazer 
guerra. E la razón es que non 
pueden ni deve ninguno traer 
armas sin licencia del príncipe. 
E ay otra razón, que ninguno 
no puede ni deve tomar derecho 
de otro si le á hecho tuerto; mas 
conviene qu’el príncipe le haga 
justicia. Mas el día de oy cada 
uno manda hazer guerra, lo cual 
de derecho hazer no se deve.
B.
Se ung altre prince que 
l’empereur peut ordonner guerre.
Puisque je vous ay dit et moustré 
comment l’empereur peut 
ordonner et commander guerre, 
maintenant nous convient il 
sçavoir comment ainsi le feront 
les aultres princes cèst a dire se 
ils pourront ordonner guerre. A 
quoy je vous respons que ouy 
selon droit, car le conseil de faire 
guerre est devers les princes, ainsi 
que dient les loix, mais selon la 
verité, aultre personne qui ne 
soit prince ne peut commander 
guerre generale. Et la raison si 
est, car nuls ne doit ne ne peut 
porter armes sans la licence du 
prince. Et aussi selon l’aultre 
raison ung homme ne peut pas 
de soy mesme prendre de faire 
droit de ung aultre se tort lui 
tient, mais il est necessaire que 
le prince fasse justice entre ses 
hommes. Toutefois aujourd’huy 
chascun veult commander guerre 
et mesme ung simple chevalier 
contre ung aultre. Ce que faire ne 
se doit selon les droits.
C.
Se aultre prince que lempereur 
peut ordonner ne commander 
guerre.
Presce que je vous ay dit comment 
lempereur peut ordonner guerre, 
nous convient il scavoir se le 
feront les autres seigneurs, cest 
a scavoir, silz pourront ordonner 
guerre. Je vous dy que ouy selon 
droit, car le conseil de faire guerre 
est par devers les seigneurs se 
dient les drois. Mais selon verite 
aultre personne qui ne soit prince 
ne peut commander guerre 
generalle. Et ceste est la raison: 
car nul ne peut ne doit porter 
armes sans la licence des princes. 
La seconde raison est car vng 
homme ne peut pas prandre droit 
de vng autre se tort il lui tient, 
mais comment (sic) que le prince 
face iustice entre ses hommes. 
Touttefois au iourduy chescun 
veult commander guerre, 
mesmement vng chevalier contre 
vng autre, ce que faire ne se doit 
selon les drois.
87. “Currently, every one wages war against others, which is against the law and must not be done”.
88. L’arbre des batailles d’Honoré Bonet, ed. Ernest Nys. Bruselas: C. Muquardt, 1883: 90-91.
89. Bonet, Honorat (Honoré Bouvet). L’arbre des batailles. Paris: Antoine Vérard, 1493 <http://gallica.bnf.
fr/ark:/12148/btv1b7300069m>.
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As can be seen, the Castilian translation obscures the precise reason Bovet’s 
initially affirmative answer to the question was based on. Princes other than the 
emperor can order and wage war, because “le conseil de faire guerre” belongs to them 
by law. At this point, the incunable used the more general term “seigneurs”, avoiding 
the ambiguity in the use of “prince” and thus establishing more clearly what, in 
contrast, is reserved solely for the prince, that is, the “guerre generale”. However, 
the Castilian version also eludes this precision. Was this simple economy in the 
translation or a deliberate political option? 
We can resort to yet another comparison, this time with a Catalan translation 
of 1429, and thus, earlier than the Castilian and whose manuscript is also in the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France:
Apres que vous he dit com lemperador pot ordonar e començar guerra nos coue saber com 
ho faran los altres princeps, co es a dir, a dir si ells poden ordonar guerra, e dits vos que hoc, 
segons dret. Car lo conseil de fer guerra es ab los princeps, ço diu lo dret. Mas segons dret altra 
persona que no sia princep no pot ordonar guerra general. E aço es la raho: car nengun no 
deu portar armes ses licencia del princep segons les leys. Laltra raho si es car vn hom no pot 
pendre dret de un altre si li te tort, mas fa que lo princep fara justicia entre aquestes. Tota 
vegada, al jorn de huy tot hom vol comandar guerra, hoc un simple cavaller contra vn altre, 
ço que pas nos deu fer segons los drets.90
As we see, the Castilian version is resolutely abbreviated and, in this sense, less 
true to an archetype which both the earlier and later versions appear to be closer and 
better adjusted to. Naturally, the result of the operation is far from being innocuous, 
although we cannot take this conclusion any further now without entering into the 
realm of conjecture.
In any case, what is shown as evidence is that the restrictive position held by 
Bovet regarding the right of war did not reflect the rather antagonistic reality that 
surrounded him. He left both things clear at the end of his argument. We now know 
that his posture, far from being unanimously accepted, even among theologians 
and jurists, would take time to impose itself. And in recent decades, historians 
have continued to pay redoubled attention to the violent outbreaks of the multiple 
forms of feud, the inimicitia, significantly persistent throughout the Middle Ages 
and a good part of the Early Modern period which would confirm all of the above 
through action —unless, of course, one teleologically refuses to see in it anything 
90. “Given that I comment to you that the emperor can order to start the war, we must know how 
the other princes can do it, that is, if they can order the war to start, and the answer is so, according 
to the law, because the law says that the advice to wage war belongs to the princes. According to the 
law only the princes can order general war. The reason is that no one can take arms without licence 
from the prince, according to the law. Another reason is that no one can avenge the injuries from other 
person and only the prince can impose justice among them. Anyway, nowadays anyone wishing to 
command war, even a simple knight against another, although this is not allowed according to the law.” 
Bibliothèque nationale de France. MSS Espagnol, 206 <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/btv1b8436401j/
f1.image>: “Aquest libre ha fet tralladar lo honorable mossen Ramon de Caldes en lany mil CCCC XXIX, 
lo qual ha escrit Loren Rexarch...”.
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more than a residue from the past and a factual liability for the future.91 Fehden 
in Franconia,92 seigneurial guerrae in Languedoc,93 inimicitiae between lineages in 
Siena94 and fights between fazioni in the Duchy of Milan95 or between bandos in 
Basque lands,96 also bandositats in the kingdom of Valencia97 or aristocratic feuds in 
England,98 to cite only a few examples from recent publications, show, beyond the 
indubitable local peculiarities, the strength and general nature of the phenomenon 
of the noble feud between the 13th and 16th centuries. It can be said, therefore, 
that the feud constituted one of these “frames and forms and patterns in which 
politics took place” that John Watts designates (always susceptible to being adapted 
and manipulated) as structures, “the basic currencies in which later medieval politics 
were conducted”, a structure moreover “that received contemporary recognition”, 
as those the English historian believes should be given priority in the analysis.99
91. For an overview of the literature produced in this field by the historiography from the Anglo-German 
area, see Feud in Medieval and Early Modern Europe, Jeppe B. Netterstrøm, Bjørn Poulsen, eds. Aarhus: 
Aarhus University Press, 2007. But one should not neglect the contribution of Italian historiography, of 
which we should mention at least: Zorzi, Andrea. “Ius erat in armis: faide e conflitti tra pratiche sociali 
e pratiche di governo”, Origini dello Stato: processi di formazione statale in Italia fra medioevo ed età moderna, 
Giorgio Chittolini, Anthony Molho, Pierangelo Schiera, eds. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994: 609-629; Zorzi, 
Andrea. “I conflitti nell’Italia comunale: riflessioni sullo stato degli studi e sulle prospettive di ricerca”, 
Conflitti, paci e vendette nell’Italia comunale, Andrea Zorzi, ed. Florence: Firenze University Press, 2009: 
7-41. Published too late to review here is also Povolo, Claudio. “Faida e vendetta tra consuetudini e 
riti processuali”. Storica, 56-57 (2013): 53-103, with an English version in “Feud and vendetta: customs 
and trial rites in Medieval and Modern Europe. A legal-anthropological approach”. Acta Historiae, 23/2 
(2015): 195-244.
92. Zmora, Hillay. The Feud in Early Modern Germany. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2011, 
and the summary dedicated to this by Stuart Carroll in: H-HRE, H-Net Reviews, October 2012 <http://
www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=35932>.
93. Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Seigneurial War and Royal Power in Later Medieval Southern France”. 
Past and Present, 208 (2010): 37-76.
94. Théry, Julien. “Faide nobiliaire et justice inquisitoire de la papauté à Sienne au temps des Neuf: les 
recollectiones d’une enquête de Benoît XII contre l’évêque Donosdeo de’ Malavolti (ASV. Collectoriae, 
61A and 404ª)”, Als die Welt in die Akten kam: Prozeßschriftgut im europäischen Mittelalter, Susanne Lepsius, 
Thomas Wetzstein, eds. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2008: 275-345.
95. Gentile, Marco. Fazioni al governo: politica e sicietà a Parma nel Quattrocento. Rome: Viella, 2009.
96. Fernández de Larrea, Jon Andoni. “Las guerras privadas: el ejemplo de los bandos oñacino y 
gamboíno en el País Vasco”. Clio & Crimen, 6 (2009): 85-109; Urizar, Hiart. “Las guerras de bandos en 
Markina: una aproximación”. Vasconia, 38 (2012): 41-66.
97. Ponsoda, Santiago; Soler, Juan Leonardo. “Violencia nobiliaria en el sur del reino de Valencia a 
finales de la Edad Media”. Anales de la Universidad de Alicante: Historia Medieval, 16 (2009-2010): 319-347.
98. Kaminsky, Howard. “The Noble Feud in the Later Middle Ages”. Past and Present, 177 (2002): 55-83; 
Armstrong, Jackson W. “Violence and Peacemaking in the English Marches towards Scotland, c.1425-
1440”, The Fifteenth Century 6: Identity and Insurgency in the Late Middle Ages, Linda Clark, ed. Woodbridge: 
The Boydell Press, 2006: 53-72.
99. Watts, John. The Making of Polities...: 34-42; Meanwhile, Stuart Carroll. Blood and Violence in Early 
Modern France. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006: 7, states that, “Feuding was integral to the conduct 
of politics in early modern France because it was one of the key forms of competition for power, a 
mechanism by which the struggle for dominance was played out. Nevertheless, when kings were able 
to satisfy the ambitions of the social elite, feuds did not result in disorder or high levels of bloodletting”.
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Otherwise, there is no solution of continuity, as sometimes professed,100 between 
feud and war. Qualitatively speaking, the former is an eventual manifestation of 
the latter in the same sense we now habitually give to war as a circumstantial 
manifestation of international relations. Of course, the word feud, of Germanic 
origin, as is war, is an infrequent term in the sources, if not completely absent in 
those from after the 13th century except for the case of the German fehde. However, 
I believe that it is less equivocal than the expression “private war”, or serves better 
to avoid precisely the ambiguity that results from the use of that expression, behind 
which lies an undoubtedly modern idea about war that associates it uniquely and 
by definition with the State. Indeed, in the culture of European ius commune, not 
only was there the notion of the distinction between public and private, but this 
distinction was fundamental precisely in the conceptualisation of political power, 
in other words, of iurisdictio. This has been defined since the time of the glossa and 
without substantial changes in later centuries, as potestas de publico introducta cum 
necessitate iuris dicendi aequitatisque statuendae.101 It is a different thing, however, 
whether this translated into something more than the defining of iurisdictio regarding 
what was beyond its reach by being confined to the private households, as the 
jurists of the ius commune, even with a basis and materials suitable for this, showed 
no interest or provision, as is known, in organising the materia iuris in public law, on 
the one hand, and private law, on the other.102 Among other reasons, it is precisely 
this ingrained reluctance which, deployed before the question of whether ha senso 
chiedersi se la faida fosse un regolamento di conti privato o un ’conflitto internazionale’?, led 
Stefano Mannoni to respond, no, con tutta probabilità e, se propio si vuole, allo stadio 
finora raggiunto dalla storiografia.103
Actually, if it did not sound too emphatic and even somewhat solemn, one 
could say that in the beginning everything was feud; with its privileges, which 
it had, the king’s wars included.104 Or, if you prefer, war was any alteration, any 
disturbance of the peace, any form of conflict resolved by resorting to the force of 
arms. Such a disorder could occur with varying repercussions involving a greater or 
smaller number of individuals, but conceptually there was no difference. And this 
100. More among anthropologists than historians. Notterstrøm, Jeppe Büchert. “Introduction: The Study 
of Feud in Medieval and Early Modern History”, Feud in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Jeppe Bückert 
Netterstrøn; Bjørn Poulsen, eds. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2007: 46-48.
101. See Vallejo, Jesús. Ruda equidad...: 40-49.
102. Chevrier, Georges. “Remarques sur l’introduction et les vicissitudes de la distinction du ’jus 
privatum’ et du ’jus publicum’ dans les oeuvres des anciens juristes français”. Archives de philosophie 
du droit, 1 (1952): 5-77. On the importance of the question in the political order and the way it affects 
the historiographic practice, Schaub, Jean-Frédéric. “El pasado republicano del espacio público”, Los 
espacios públicos en Iberoamérica: ambigüedades y problemas: siglos XVIII-XIX, François-Xavier Guerra, Annick 
Lempérière, eds. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998: 27-53.
103. “there is any sense asking whether the feud was a private settling of scores or an ’international 
conflict’?”, “no, not in all probability and in the current state of historiography if you like”. Mannoni, 
Stefano. “Relazioni internazionali”, Lo Stato moderno in Europa: istituzioni e diritto, Maurizio Fioravanti, ed. 
Rome-Bari: Laterza: 2002: 206-229: 208.
104. Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine...: 76 and following.
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identification of such a wide and diverse range of events with war would last long, 
as Merio Scattola was able to see:
Ancora nel Seicento gli autori politici continuano a chiedersi come debbano essere interpretate 
le diverse forme di conflitto e rispondono che guerra è lo scontro tra autorità pubbliche, ma 
è anche il contrasto tra privati oppure quello misto tra persone private e persone pubbliche. 
Guerra è in primo luogo il duello, ma guerra sono allo stesso tempo anche le repressaliae, le 
faide tra casati nobili, tra città o tra altre forme di potestà, come guerra è la ’legittima difesa’ 
del magistrato inferiore contro i comandi iniqui del re e l’autodifesa del privato assalito da 
un predone, fosse costui anche l’imperatore in persona, quando la pubblica autorità non può 
intervenire in tempo.105
In line, as we saw, with a reasoning that was both topical and casuistic, not 
axiomatic, and prudential, not epistemic, jurists and theologians106 dispensed with a 
prior definition, a pre-stablished concept, of therefore a strict and fixed delimitation 
of what war is. This is simply part of the phenomenology of the conflict, which is in 
turn intrinsic to the social reality and does not constitute, in that mode of reasoning, 
a subject of theory, but rather a matter to examine from the varied and changing 
experience, in response to the specific and substantive issues that arise from each 
case related with justice and morality, with the order of law and that of theology. 
Hence, the reflection on war did not constitute an autonomous body of knowledge, 
a self-sufficient subject, but instead became a tradition of thought on just war, that 
is, about the conditions war must meet to avoid clashing with the principles and 
values that the aforementioned disciplines had it in their charge to rule.
However, the practice of war broadly understood as feud, which envisaged 
and also included formulas and specific rites of achievement and restoration of 
peace as a corollary, is much earlier than the intellectual tradition —starting not 
before the 12th century— of just war, although much the configuration of the 
latter certainly used materials that were just as old.107 We have already referred 
above to a whole historiography effectively focussed on the study of conflicts, their 
warlike manifestations and the extrajudicial mechanisms for resolving them in the 
immediately post-Carolingian centuries, a period that has been considered l’âge d’or 
de la faide.108 How then did the architects and those who generally accepted the just 
105. “Still in the 17th century, the political authors continued asking themselves how the diverse forms 
of conflict should be interpreted, and they answered that war is the clash between public powers, but 
also the discord between individuals, or of a mixed nature between private and public people. In first 
place war is the duel, plus war is at the same time and equally the represaliae, the faide between noble 
lineages, between cities or between other forms of power, as war is the ’legitimate defence’ of the lower 
magistrate against the king’s wicked commands and the self-defence of the individual attacked by a 
robber, although this be the emperor in person, when the public authority fails to intervene in time”. 
Scattola, Merio. “Introduzione”, Figure della guerra: la riflessione su pace, conflitto e giustizia tra Medioevo e 
prima età moderna, Merio Scattola, ed. Milan: Franco Angeli, 2003: 16-17.
106. Villey, Michel. Questions de Saint Thomas sur le droit et la politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1987.
107. Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine...: 11 and following.
108. “the golden age of feud”. Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine...: 81.
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war tradition doctrinally and practically face the widespread and enduring reality of 
feud after that time, as we have also had occasion to note?
There were two traits of mentality and culture that sustained the feud. In the first 
place, there was the idea that we speak disapprovingly of nowadays, namely “taking 
justice into one’s own hands”. This, however, was an idea and a practice that, under 
certain circumstances, basically which allowed one to invoke legitimate defence, 
could be accepted and accommodated by scholastic culture and particularly by its 
legal expression, the ius commune, especially because the latter will always regard 
the resort to war as an exsecutio iuris, all the more legitimate when it was somebody 
endowed with iurisdictio —thus a public entity— who enacted this and put it into 
effect109. It is true that from the 13th century, in the most urbanised regions of Europe, 
other developments and thus other values were moving slowly in the opposite 
direction. Without leaving the subject of law, the increased scope for initiative for 
a judge in the procedural sphere, which would allow him to act inquisitorially ex 
officio, will then be at the starting point of a change of direction in the history of 
penal justice with undeniable consequences for the element of revenge inherent 
to the feud.110 That enlarged capacity of intervention by the judge (in other words, 
by a political power) will unhesitatingly be justified formally by invoking custom, 
not the law, and the novel principle on the merits that offence does not just harm 
its victim but also the civitas or communitas (since it infringes the pax publica). This is 
a good example of the not always concurrent, but often contradictory, tendencies 
that could arise within the ius commune and that, after all, reflected those of the 
same nature in the social reality that the law attempted to regulate. At the same 
time, discourses proliferating since the 13th century extolling the value of peace as 
a foundation of social order —at times voiced as movements for peace-keeping, as 
seen especially in Italian cities— also targeted the practice of vendetta. Nevertheless, 
as Andrea Zorzi aptly remarks in this respect, i valori del discorso politico non erano 
neutri, ma appartenevano a un registro variabile declinato nel vivo del conflitto politico, 111 
which cautions against drawing an absolute and generalized antithesis between 
peace-extolling discourses on one hand, and the practice of revenge on the other.
In fact, far from being incompatible with, or unrelated to, the feud, peace was the 
other side of the coin, its second trait of cultural identity. This peace was, however, 
understood as the maintenance and continuous renovation of an order and a 
109. Quaglioni, Diego. “Le ragioni della guerra e della pace”, Pace e guerra nel basso medioevo: atti del 
XL Convegno storico internazionale (Todi, oct. 2003). Spoleto: Fondazione Centro Italiano di Studi Sull’Alto. 
Medio Evo, 2004: 113-129; Quaglioni, Diego. “Pour une histoire du droit de guerre...”.
110. Sbriccoli, Mario. “Vidi communiter observari: l’emmersione di un ordine penale pubblico nelle città 
italiane del secolo XIII”. Quaderni fiorentini per la storia del pensiero giuridico moderno, 27 (1998): 232-268.
111. “the values of political discourse were anything but neutral, they were incorporated into a changing 
register that adapted itself to each occasion of political conflict”. Zorzi, Andrea. “Fracta est civitas magna 
in tres partes: conflitto e costituzione nell’Italia comunale”. Scienza & Politica, 39 (2008): 61-87: 68. On 
the proliferation of the motif of peace in sermons and political discourses: Prêcher la paix et discipliner la 
société: Italie, France, Angleterre (XIIIe-XVe siècles), Rosa Maria Dessi, ed. Turnhout: Brepols, 2005; Offenstadt, 
Nicolas. Faire la paix au Moyen Âge: discours et gestes de paix pendant la guerre de Cent Ans. Paris: Odile Jacob, 
2007.
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balance considered natural rather than the mere absence of war. The same was true 
for a peace, not imposed, but achieved through mutual compensation and entrusted 
with the permanent threat of war, but also pacts and negotiation. In this respect, 
European ius commune did not lack the capacity to integrate the feud, as it shared the 
presupposition of the existence of an immutable natural order that reached the social 
reality and that had to be safeguarded at any cost, as it was identified with justice 
itself. However, the development of this law would also open the path for a distinct 
way of achieving this target that would end up prevailing and would continue to 
have consequences in relation with war, the notion of this and its practice. To use 
a fortunate and expressive formula, this was the way that led from a negotiated, 
communal and restorative justice to another hegemonic or bureaucratic and of a 
punitive character.112 Or, in another no less intuitively revealing statement, from a 
peace-centered order to public order.113 Shortly after 1750, one could read Crimen 
fractae pacis publicae constituunt etiam diffidationes, seu bella priuatorum in a manual 
of what we would nowadays call penal law, whose author still did not forget the 
contrast that this represented with earlier times explicitly referred to as prior to the 
1600s, as those wars, that could no longer called as such without specifying, olim, 
vi iuris manuarii, omnibus, summis et imis permissa, quia ius belli gerendi tunc temporis 
non erat regale, vt hodie.114 There was talk in this step of crimes contra securitatem et 
vtilitatem publicam and the manual was German, but, in general lines, the diagnosis 
was valid for all Europe.
The aforesaid novelties and changes of orientation, some hardly insinuated in the 
13th century, would take centuries to assert themselves and displace or subordinate 
earlier ideas and uses, so many that, even without going beyond the corresponding 
chronological limits of the validity of the ius commune, only from an exaggeratedly 
teleological perspective can one ignore or relegate such ideas and uses in order to 
explain the late medieval and early modern centuries. There is no lack of arguments 
to sustain that the assembly of all the components of what is commonly known as 
the doctrine of just war did not really come about until around 1500.115 We know 
that one of these pieces, the one that reserved the exclusive right to wage war to 
the sovereign prince, would not garner general adhesion until the end of the 16th 
century. Under these conditions, the two above-mentioned characteristic aspects of 
112. Sbriccoli, Mario. “Giustizia negoziata, giustizia egemonica: riflessioni su una nueva fase degli studi 
di storia della giustizia criminale”, Criminalità e giustizia in Germania e in Italia: pratiche giudiziarie e linguaggi 
giuridici tra tardo medioevo ed età moderna, Marco Bellabarba, Gerd Schwerhoff, Andrea Zorzi, eds. Bologna: 
Il Mulino, 2001: 345-364; Sbriccoli, Mario. “Giustizia criminale”, Lo Stato moderno in Europa...: 163-205.
113. Povolo, Claudio. “Dall’ordine della pace all’ordine pubblico: uno sguardo da Venezia e il suo stato 
territoriale (secoli XVI-XVIII)”, Processo e difesa penale in età moderna: Venezia e il suo stato territoriale, Claudio 
Povolo, ed. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007; 15-107.
114. Meister, Christian Georg Friedrich. Principia iuris criminalis Germaniae communis. Göttingen: Victorino 
Bossiegel, 1780: 242. The first edition dates from 1755.
115. Johnson, James Turner. Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: Religious and Secular Concepts, 1200-
1740. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975: 8.
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the feud, not foreign to the protean and versatile system of ius commune,116 would 
still enjoy long vitality. A deeply-rooted culture of revenge, not at all irreconcilable 
with caritas117 nor always with misericordia118, could continue to be deployed after 
the 13th century, a culture nowadays increasingly dealt with and better known 
to historians.119 The two modes of justice mentioned, the negotiated justice and 
official justice, far from being mutually exclusive and the latter replacing the former 
without further ado, would intertwine in such a way that one could talk about 
an authentic osmosis between the two throughout the Ancien Régime, which led 
Mario Sbriccoli to conclude:
L’attitudine negoziale e l’idea della ritorsione verranno bandite dal campo penale soltanto 
con l’arrivo della codificazione, dopo la svolta epocale originata dalla Rivoluzione francese: 
ma anche l’assolutismo dei codici dovrà fare i conti con la lunga durata e adattare il suo 
passo a quello, ben più lento, della cultura dei popoli e delle persone.120
In fact, the parties in the judicial process used this on more than a few occasions 
to perfect a prior agreement, not to show the impossibility of reaching it, or as an 
instrument of pressure during a negotiation.121 These were strategies that not only 
displayed the initial preference of the social actors for the more traditional and less 
dramatic or theatrical forms of justice122 —and surely also less expensive—, but also 
equally the validity, as we have seen, of the ideological principal of subordination 
116. Claudio Povolo wrote: Il complessivo discorso giuridico conosciuto come diritto comune, lungi dall’attestare 
l’affermazione di una giustizia espressione egemonica della state law, era funzionale al mantenimento di quel 
sistema giuridico comunitario, caratterizzato da un’innata vocazione compromissoria e dalla faida (“The global 
legal discourse known as diritto comune, far from witnessing the affirmation of justice that expressed the 
hegemony of state law, was funtional for the maintenance of that communal legal system characterised 
by an innate arbitration vocation and the feud”. “Dall’ordine della pace...”: No. 8). Meanwhile, Mario 
Sbriccoli spoke about “la logica anti-imperativistica del diritto comune” (“the anti-imperative logic of the ius 
commune”) in “Giustizia criminale...”: 170.
117. Throop, Susanna.A. Crusading as an Act of Vengeance, 1095-1216. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011.
118. Buc, Philippe. “Some Thoughts on the Christian Theology of Violence, Medieval and Modern, from 
the Middle Ages to the French Revolution”. Rivista di Storia del Cristianesimo, 5/1 (2008): 9-28.
119. Vengeance in Medieval Europe: A Reader, Daniel Lord Smail, Kelly Gibson, eds. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 2009; Hyams, Paul R. Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England. Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2003; Vengeance in the Middle Ages: Emotion, Religion and Feud, Susanna A. Throop, Paul 
R. Hyams, eds. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010; Nassiet, Michel. La violence, une histoire sociale: France XVIe-XVIIIe 
siècles. Seyssel: Champ Vallon, 2011: maxime chapters 4 (“Vengeance et faide”) and 9 (“La culture de 
vengeance dans les guerres de religion”); Carroll, Stuart. Martyrs and Murderers: The Guise Family and the 
Making of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009; Miller, William Ian. Eye for an eye. Cambridge 
(UK): Cambridge University Press, 2006.
120. “The negotiating attitude and the idea of retaliation would be banished from the criminal field only 
with the arrival of codification, after the change of epoch provoked by the French Revolution, but also 
the absolutism of the codes must settle with the long-term and adapt to the much slower speed of the 
culture of the peoples and individuals”. Sbriccoli, Mario. “Giustizia criminale...”: 172.
121. See the monographic issue on “Procedure di giustizia”, Renata Ago, Simona Cerutti, eds. Quaderni 
storici, 101 (1999) 107-473.
122. On the penal process as a “theatre of power”, Povolo, Claudio. “Dall’ordine della pace...”: 15-107.
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of the iustitia to the caritas, that is, of the clearly subsidiary character of law with 
respect to religion.123 The judges shared this presupposition and encouraged the 
parties to reach agreements when the process was inevitable, while they did not 
hesitate to combine a repressive and exemplifying conception of punishment with a 
consideration of this as anche luogo e occasione per il recupero della dimensione ’negoziale’ 
del giudizio, fondata sulla consuetudine, sull’equità, sulla misericordia.124
Moreover, the judicial sentences and decisions —which did not need to be 
motivated and did not cease to take the intuitus personae into consideration— were 
sometimes no more than an intermediate episode later exploited by the parties 
towards a negotiated end of the conflict, as has been lucidly shown recently for 
the numerous aristocratic clashes and wars that took place in the south of France 
during the 14th century.125 Just as instrumental and inconclusive were the frequent 
royal decrees during those wars, restricting or prohibiting them.126 The role of the 
royal officials became more like that of real arbitrators and mediators according 
to their status —and not necessarily their position— whose actions, however, 
contributed resolutely to resolving those conflicts while also serving to increase the 
presence of the central power within the local and regional powers, more through 
their involvement in these commitments than through coercion. Something similar 
could have been claimed about the stati regionali italiani di epoca moderna, che solo con 
molta difficoltà riuscivano a garantire il mantenimento di un ordine pubblico costantemente 
minacciato dalle dinamiche fazionarie, and in which gli stessi giusdicenti locali si vedevano 
istituzionalmente investiti di funzioni più di tipo politico-mediatorie che di amministrazione 
della giustizia stricto sensu.127 The path towards the assertion of a “public penal law” 
from its first stirrings in the 13th century was not short or easy, but rather a lunga 
e tormentata storia, again in the words of one of its most knowledgeable experts.128 
The criminalisation of the feud and the consequent limitation of the right to and 
the concept of war was a chapter in this story, one that only concluded around 
1600, not by chance coinciding with what historians consider the high point of the 
brigandage and banditry of the Ancien Régime, a phenomenon whose protagonists 
123. See also Broggio, Paolo. “Linguaggio religioso e disciplinamento nobiliare: il “modo di ridurre a pace 
l’inimicitie private nella trattatistica di età barocca”, I linguaggi del potere nell’età barocca 1. Politica e religione, 
Francesca Cantù, ed. Rome: Viella, 2009: 275-317.
124. “also the place and occasion for recovering the ’negotiable’ dimension of the trial, based on custom, 
equity, misericordia”. Sbriccoli, Mario. “Giustizia criminale...”: 171. See also Alessi, Giorgia. Il processo 
penale: profilo storico. Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2007: 97 and following.
125. Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Jura in medio: the settlement of seigneurial disputes in later medieval 
Languedoc”. French History, 26/4 (2012): 441-459.
126. Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Jura in medio...”: 447-449; Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Seigneurial war 
and royal power...”: 51-60.
127. “the Italian stati regionali from the early modern epoch, that only with great difficulty managed 
to maintain a public order constantly threatened by the factionary dynamics”, “the self-same local 
judges found themselves institutionally invested with functions more of the political-mediating type 
than the administration of justice stricto sensu”. Broggio, Paolo. “Linguaggio religioso e disciplinamento 
nobiliare...”: 284.
128. “long and tempestuous history”, Sbriccoli, Mario. “Vidi communiter observari...”: 254.
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in many cases, as has been shown, seem to have been more hijos de la faida antes que 
de la miseria.129 Nor is it plausible to attribute to chance that it was precisely in the 
17th century when historiography began to talk retrospectively and with reprobation 
of “private wars”.130
Until then, language was also a battlefield. There were no relevant differences 
in either form or substance between wars by the princes and those undertaken 
by other lords (except for the obvious growing asymmetry of forces that ones and 
the others could mobilise). However, it has been shown that while those near the 
former carefully avoided calling the conflicts involving the latter “wars”, the parties 
involved in these made open use of the word.131 It was another way of pushing 
reality along a path and in a precise direction, this time through resort to a selective 
use of language that not only aspired to describe the experience but also configure 
it in a specific sense. The resort that, as is known, Humpty Dumpty knew so well 
and Alice had the opportunity to test out. In the late Middle Ages and early modern 
period, rhetoric was all the more an important part of political action since the 
communis opinio forged by jurists (the principal source of civilis sapientia, and through 
which that political action must be legitimated) was not necessarily resolved, as we 
saw, by the existence of a single, indisputable view or decision. The same action 
could be conceptualised, for example, as rebellion or as resistance, understood as an 
offence deserving punishment or as the exercise of legitimate defence, addressed, 
in the end, as crimen laesae maiestatis or interpreted as a legitimate action by those 
habent iustam causam superioribus resistendi.132
129. “children of the feud rather than of misery”. Torres, Xavier. “Faide e banditismo nella Catalogna dei 
secoli XVI e XVII”, Banditismi mediterranei (secoli XVI-XVII), Francesco Manconi, ed. Rome: Carocci, 2003. 
See also Torres, Xavier. “Guerra privada y bandolerismo en la Cataluña del Barroco”. Historia social, 1 
(1988): 5-18; Povolo, Claudio. “La conflittualità nobiliare in Italia nella seconda metà del Cinquecento. 
Il caso della Repubblica di Venezia: alcune ipotesi e possibili interpretazioni”. Atti dell’Istituto Veneto di 
Scienze, Letter e ed Arti, 151 (1992-1993): 89-139; Povolo, Claudio. “Retoriche giudizarie, dimensioni 
del penale e prassi processuale nella Repubblica di Venezia: da Lorenzo Priori ai pratici settecenteschi”, 
L’amministrazione della giustizia penale nella Repubblica di Venezia (secoli XVI-XVIII), II: Retoriche, stereotipi, 
prassi, Claudio Povolo, Giovanni Chiodi, eds. Verona: Cierre Edizioni, 2004: 19-170.
130. Cange, Charles du Fresne du. “Des guerres privées et du droit de guerre par coutume”, Glossarium 
mediae et infimae latinitatis. Graz: Akademische Druck-u. Verlagsanstalt, 1954: X, 100-108 (first edition 
in 1678). The expressions bellum publicum and bellum privatum can be found in the medieval doctrinal 
sources, the first much earlier and the second markedly later, from the 14th century on, the latter surely 
introduced, after an isolated precedent in Summa by Thomas Aquinas, through the Romenising reflex 
of the jurists Haggenmacher, Peter. Grotius et la doctrine...: 83, 114 and following, also indicating the 
nonexistence of a relevant semantic distinction between bellum and guerra. The sources of the practice 
use the expression guerra publica to define the 14th-century seigniorial wars in Languedoc, while the 
antonymic expression never appears in these. Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Seineurial war...”: 38 (note 4); 
Firnhaber-Baker, Justine. “Jura in medio...”: 445. El Árbol de batallas, in the way of Giovanni da Legnano, 
in a passage contrasts guerra particular y general, see Árbol de batallas: versión castellana...: 125; L’arbre des 
batailles d’Honoré Bonet...: 229.
131. See Gamberini, Andrea. “Le parole della guerra nel ducato di Milano: un linguaggio cetuale”, 
Linguaggi politici nell’Italia del Rinascimento, Andrea Gamberini, Giuseppe Petralia, eds. Rome: Viella, 2007: 
445-467.
132. The latter sentence is from the Disquisitio prior iuridica with which the Italian cities defended 
themselves from Henry VII in 1313. Benedictis, Angela de. Tumulti: moltitudini ribelli in età moderna. 
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Some argue that military violence increased in the period between 1500 and 
1700.133 We have already had occasion to point out that this is not nowadays a 
unanimous opinion. In the end, as Francesco Benigno wrote with rotundity and 
insight, “violence is not a thing, it is a judgment”.134 However, first the Italian Wars, 
then the European wars of religion had bathed Western Europe in blood throughout 
the 16th century. In a context modified by the looming Turkish threat and the 
unexpected expansion of the ecumene, together with the effect the development 
of the printing press must have had on the spread and interpretation of all this, 
the perception of war, in a century that also experienced nuovi e sanguinosi modi 
di guerreggiare, in Guicciardini’s words,135 must also have undergone significant 
changes. The discovery of the inner barbarism, within a broken Christendom, and 
the blurring of differences with the external barbarian and the new savage humanity 
were undoubtedly a novelty that has since then left its imprint in one sense or 
another on European history and the discourses about this.136 So too has the central 
role of war in reflections about how to organise the coexistence of Europeans137 
—with enormous long-term political consequences.
However, the feud was not replaced directlly by a State monopoly over war. This 
is not the conclusion that should be reached from the criminalisation of the former 
and the restriction of the concept of the latter once the ius ad bellum effectively became 
an exclusive prerogative of the prince and war then became primarily external, war 
between princes. As shown above, the sole possibility of internal resistance and of 
this leading to a resort to arms —not to mention tyrannicide— could be considered 
juridically as a licit option138 conditioned, if not belied, the fact that the identification 
Bologna: Il Mulino, 2013: 107 and following. For the relation between discursive strategies and political 
action see also the rich example analysed by Bellabarba, Marco. “Ordine congiunto e ordine stratificato: 
note su diritto di faida e territorio nel tardo Medioevo”, Chiesa cattolica e mondo moderno: scritti in onore di 
Paolo Prodi, Adriano Prosperi, Pierangelo Schiera, Gabriella Zarri, eds. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2007: 387-
401, and more generally, Gamberini, Andrea. “The language of politics and the process of state-building: 
approaches and interpretations”, The Italian Renaissance State, Andrea Gamberini, Isabella Lazzarini eds. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2012: 406-424.
133. Like Reinhardt, Wolfgang. Storia del potere politico in Europa. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2001: 421 and 
following.
134. Benigno, Francesco. Las palabras del tiempo...: 172.
135. In his Storia d’Italia, but I take the quote from Fournel, Jean-Louis; Zancarini, Jean-Claude. La 
grammaire de la république: langages de la politique chez Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540). Genoa: Droz, 2009: 
376.
136. Schaub, Jean-Frédéric. “Nous, les barbares: expansion européenne et découverte de la fragilité 
intérieure”, Histoire du monde au XVe siècle. 2: Temps et devenirs du monde, Patrick Boucheron, dir. Paris: 
Fayard, 2012: 672-700; Scuccimarra, Luca. I confini del mondo: storia del cosmopolitismo dall’Antichità al 
Settecento. Bologna: Il Mulino, 2006: 189 and following.
137. Fournel, Jean-Louis. “Dire autrement la politique et la guerre européennes (XVIe-XVIIe siècles)”, 
Guerres, conflits, violence: l’état de la recherche, Paris: Autrement, 2010: 32-35; Barbier, Maurice. La modernité 
politique. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2000: 50-54.
138. Benedictis, Angela de. Politica, governo e istituzioni...: 297 and following; Benedictis, Angela de. 
“Abattere I tiranni, punire I rebelli: diritto e violenza negli interdetti del Rinascimento”. Rechtsgeschichte, 
11 (2007): 76-93; Benedictis, Angela de. “Resisting Public Violence: Actions, Law and Emotions”, Finding 
Europe: Discourses on Margins, Communities, Images, Anthony Molho, Diogo Ramada Curto, eds. New York-
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of war with the prince was an authentic monopoly. Regarding external wars, while 
the Thirty Years War finally managed to ruin all dreams of universal monarchy,139 
the new international order that arose from the fragile peace treaties of the 1640s 
and 50s does not seem to have brought with it a radical redefinition of the political 
subjects who were then acting on the European geopolitical stage, however much 
the “myth of Westphalia” is still recited nowadays as that of the birth of a first 
modern system of States.140 Far from it, it was just around these dates, however, 
when the twin ideas of a State as a political artifice and an individual as a “person”, 
the two inventions that would bring with them a drastic lurch towards political 
modernity, were only just beginning to be imagined or suspected, with war certainly 
present in the historical reality and as a logical trigger. But it would still take almost 
one and a half centuries, at least on the continent, for the Leviathan to come to life 
in a painful birth and, by expropriating the old “persons” who had all iurisdictio (all 
political power), leave them as mere private subjects.
Did war create the State via taxation? For the period under consideration here, 
we should at least doubt it.141 It is not only that the thesis —“an essentially outside-in 
and above-below explanation”— exudes a large dose of the old Rankean postulate 
of the primacy of foreign policy and ignores the varied internal social and political 
dialectic present in each case, as has been argued from a perspective of “political 
Marxism” that keeps alive the once most appreciated and heeded debate about the 
transition from feudalism to capitalism.142 Nor is it either only a question of the 
haste that leads some to preach the excessively early consummation of this ménage 
à trois, as it has been wittily called;143 nor that the explicative contrivance made up 
of these three pieces having a certain air of a mechanism for the natural selection 
of states with markedly teleological bias, “sometimes of the dangerous teleology 
Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007: 273-290; Benedictis, Angela de. Tumulti...; Jouanna, Arlette. Le devoir de 
révolte: la noblesse française et la gestation de l’État moderne, 1559-1661. Paris: Fayard, 1989; Turchetti, Mario. 
Tyrannie et tyrannicide de l’Antiquité à nos jours. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001.
139. See Rosbach, Franz. Monarchia universalis: storia di un concetto cardine della politica europea (secoli XVI-
XVIII). Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1998.
140. From different perspectives, Osiander, Andreas. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the 
Westphalian Myth”. International Organization, 55 (2001): 251-287; Teschke, Benno. The Myth of 1648: 
Class, Geopolitics and the Making of Modern International Relations. London: Verso, 2003.
141. As one might also qualify an affirmative response for the contemporary epoch: “warfare is not more 
than a catalyst of state building but to ignite and sustain fire one needs solid and durable wood”, as Siniša 
Malešević wrote. He believed that that intervention was also essential in the processing of ideological 
factors that give social cohesion and political legitimacy. See Malešević, Siniša. “Did Wars Make Nation-
States in the Balkans?: Nationalisms, Wars and States in the 19th and early 20th Century South East 
Europe”. Journal of Historical Sociology, 25/3 (2012): 299-330 the quote is on p. 324.
142. Techke, Benno. “Revisiting the ’War-Makes-States’ Thesis: War, Taxation and Social Property 
Relations in Early Modern Europe”, War, the State and International Law in Seventeenth-Century Europe, Olaf 
Asbach, Peter Schröder, eds. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010: 35-59, a quote between hyphens, on p. 42.
143. Carocci, Sandro; Simone M. Collavini. “The Cost of States: Politics and Exactions in the Christian 
West (Sixth to Fifteenth Centuries)”, Diverging Paths? The Shapes of Power and Institutions in Medieval 
Christendom and Islam, John Hudson, Ana Rodríguez, eds. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2014: 125-158: 148; 
also Italian translation in Storica, 52 (2012): 7-48: 36. 
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aimed at explaining what has made us superior”.144 These are the typical drawbacks 
of the history of great strides that historical sociology tends to fall into and that 
leads to mistaking causes for conditions of possibility. But rather than any of that, 
what is at stake regarding the difficulty of uncritically accepting that surprisingly 
successful and widespread tripartite formula is a conceptual problem:145 namely, 
that which underlies the usual (implicit or explicit) likening of prince and State,146 
an assimilation whose usual outcome is to mistakenly take for granted, for example, 
what  law or legislation must have been at the time, as we saw earlier, or for that 
matter, also taxation. But even with prerogatives which undoubtedly set him apart 
as a “mystical body”, acknowledged duties and functions, and the convention 
that he should have the adequate means to fulfil them, in that model of political 
organisation which has come to be termed jurisdictional (the fundamental model 
for the architecture of European kingdoms and republics of the 13th-18th centuries), 
the prince (whether an individual or a collective person) was not the State but a 
state (in the sense of status), since in order to become the former and cease to be the 
latter, it was imperative to change the nature of the legal order.
Why would first the late medieval and then the early modern military competition 
need a transformation of its main participants in a State-building sense? It was a 
contingent result, one would say. Then, why organise the story from this result, 
privileging this point of view? Did England not become a military power in the 18th 
century, financed with a very heavy taxation policy that was the responsibility, not 
of the king, but rather Parliament, without that altering substantially a typically 
jurisdictional institutional system and government?147 The evolution of the 
kingdoms and republics on the continent was surely distinct and varied, and a more 
pressing and ongoing mutual military pressure must have contributed to this, one 
that this insular kingdom was freed from. But what decisively marked the difference 
was undoubtedly the disparate degree of corporative integration reached in each 
case, which obeyed each one’s particular formative history, conditioned the fiscal 
model and determined the level of territorial and political cohesion. If this forced 
a resort to informal or, in the literal sense, extraordinary, forms of government 
with the aim of streamlining the reaching of a target or increasing efficacy in the 
handling of a question, as was effectively frequently done in relation with military 
affairs, we know that such expedients found a habitual justification, although not 
always pacific, in the “economic” and “absolute” dimensions of the power of the 
144. Carocci, Sandro; Simone M. Collavini. “Il costo degli stati: politica e prelievo...”: 7-48: 36.
145. “The broad consensus and widespread unanimity across the disciplines of history, historical sociology 
and International Relations on the significance of internal nexus between war —or, more broadly, 
geopolitical competition— taxation and early modern state-formation constitutes”, in Benno Teschke’s 
opinion, “an exceptional rarity in the field of human enquiry”. See “Revisiting the ’War-Makes-States’ 
Thesis...”: 35.
146. For the contrast between the two, Schaub, Jean Fréderic. “Sobre el concepto de Estado”. Historia 
Contemporánea, 28 (2004): 47-51.
147. As the role of jurisprudence of the ius commune corresponded there, as is known, to that of a 
differentiated common law. About what is said in the text, see Mannori, Luca; Sordi, Bernardo. Storia del 
diritto amministrativo...: 79 and after, and also for the following.
Imago TemporIs. medIum aevum, ix (2015): 67-107 / issn 1888-3931 / doi 10.21001/itma.2015.9.03
105After the 12th century: WAr And legAl Order
prince. Thus, it was not something entirely unrelated to an institutional order of a 
jurisdictional nature. They neither could (for material and cultural reasons which 
there is no room here to develop) nor claimed to be exponents of a new state logic 
or rationality, and its use, even where it reached a greater intensity, as happened in 
France, although it permitted the development of a parallel bureaucracy, this was 
not presented as an alternative to the old magistratures, and was not configured, 
ultimately, according to la ’moderna’ contrapposizione tra chi giudica e chi amministra.148
There were formulas and mechanisms through which the main European political 
powers prior to the 19th century could maintain an effective and by no means 
negligible military force without this being accompanied by an unusual bureaucratic 
deployment, by a redoubled coercive capacity or any other of the assumptions that 
are usually brought up when the argument is focussed on a perspective of State-
building. The resort to “military enterprises”, whose flourishing throughout the late 
medieval and early modern periods has recently been highlighted, was undoubtedly 
one of these formulas.149 And the same historiography that has not managed to rid 
itself of the State as a concept, as an institutional reality or as a tool for analysing 
the Ancien Régime, can only increasingly underline in recent decades its weakness, 
the enormous rift between its rhetoric and the reality of the power it was able 
to exercise, its dependence on negotiation and agreement with peripheral or local 
powers. What kind of Leviathan was this? Would it not be better now to accept that 
this is a mirage and declare its non-existence? If not, there is a real risk of becoming 
ensnared in its logic, or, in the best of cases, of it hindering the appreciation of 
another logic that had little or nothing to do with the State.
After fighting against the “feudal revolution” around the year 1000, Dominique 
Barthélemy declared himself instead a rather convinced “mutationist” in the case of 
the 12th century, a century, he said, that divided medieval history into two epochs.150 
The feud and informal justice would have dominated the forms of establishing 
order in the former period, which would have given way in the mentioned century 
to a savant law and the “genesis of the modern State”. Even the most seasoned 
historiography of the High Middle Ages ends up declaring evident, in terms of 
what followed, things it shouldn’t. A very recent and detailed reconstruction of 
the campaign carried out in the region of the Upper Rhine between July 1444 and 
March 1445 by the future Louis XI of France, at the head of a large army mainly 
made up of mercenaries, clearly shows, conversely, how the intricate network of the 
multiple powers with different reach that intertwined, overlapped and competed in 
the region, the autonomous strategy decided by each of these, the changing and 
148. “the ’modern’ contradistinction between who judges and who administers”: Mannori, Luca; Sordi, 
Bernardo. Storia del diritto amministrativo...: 100-101.
149. Parrott, David. The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe. 
Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press, 2012; War, Entrepreneurs, and the State in Europe and the 
Mediterranean, 1300-1800, Jeff Fynn-Paul, ed. Leiden & Boston: Brill, 2014.
150. Barthélemy, Dominique. “La vengeance, le jugement et le compromis”, Le règlement des conflits au 
Moyen Âge. Actes du XXXIe congrès de la SHMESP (Angers, 2000). Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2001: 
11-20: 13.
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crosslinked alliances or the important political role played in this context by the 
Council of Basel as the arbitration and mediation agency between the contenders, 
all made up a scenario that can hardly give adequate reason to “the language of 
nationhood and state-formation”.151 What the 12th century actually ushered in was 
a jurisdictional political culture that historians have tended to ignore by considering 
it as merely the prelude to the state political culture. A whole stage of European 
history is thereby lost. And it is a shame, because paying it due attention helps 
us to understand that the advent of the State was not something necessary and 
inevitable. It was an option, as was at the time, by constitution, a jurisdictional 
modernity.152 But that, as they say, is another story.
5. Conclusions
For people’s beliefs about a political system are not something outside of it, they are part of it. 
Those beliefs, however they are formed or determined, do determine the limits and possible 
development of the system; they determine what people will put up with, and what they will 
demand.153
Two brief, shall we say, methodological observations to finish with. The first is 
that, despite everything, the above approach remains quite far from the subject 
it contemplates. Accordingly, the resulting image has the characteristics of aerial 
photography. At first sight, the details may not be evident. And these are always 
important; as we know, God is in the detail. But it is only a way to offer an 
elementary cartography. Two factors work in favour of this being feasible without 
great distortions, despite the breadth of the territory covered: that this territory can 
be captured quite truthfully with one lens, which provides the ius commune, and that 
the differences in the details, however significant they are when seen from closer 
up, do not cancel out the similarities, the common forms that were expressions, 
as Watts stated, of “the consonances and shared patterns —the structures— of 
European political life”.154
The second observation is as follows. For a long time, if not always, history as 
a discipline has been obsessed with its scientific status, which, especially in the 
decades after the Second World War, led it to flirt openly with the so-called social 
sciences to the detriment of its traditional prolonged courtship with philology. There 
is no lack of voices among those who nowadays practice the best version (and the 
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perspective”. Journal of Medieval History, 38/3 (2012): 358-387.
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most modest, it must be said) of social science available who suggest, however, that 
it should perhaps rather be the social scientists who should take note of history, 
in other words, of the practice of the good historians.155 One could say —for we 
cannot go into details here either— that the difficulty that underlies one attitude 
or the other is the same: that of adapting the tools to the problems, a difficulty 
that first appeared in the early 19th century and whose most famous episode was 
the Methodenstreit towards the end of the same century.156 However, nowadays, we 
know how little founded a radical contrast between understanding and explanation 
was,157 two operations that can indeed work, and in fact do work, as distinct 
phases of a single process designed to explain a given social reality. If individual or 
collective beliefs are not alien to the explanation of actions, in the strong sense that 
they are liable to form part of their immediate causes, understanding the beliefs 
of people from the past, of their own perception of things, cannot be the private 
reserve of a separate history, of historiographic speciality. In those beliefs are also 
cast the institutions that regiment social life and are used by those who participate 
in it according to their interests and preferences. In his introduction to Democracy 
in America, de Tocqueville wrote that “a new science of politics is needed for a new 
world”158. The old civilis sapientia was of no use for understanding a new reality, in 
the same way that some of our most common political concepts are of little use for 
us, children of this new world, to understand that old one that no longer exists. 
They are pregnant with meaning;159 or require cumbersome redefinitions that end 
up being seen as less than fruitful.160 To tackle the political history that preceded the 
present time, and as war is the motive that has brought us here, it would be worth 
taking into account something similar to what John France recently stated about 
military history: “Looking at the past through technological glasses is a distortion 
[...]. The sophisticated analytic terms used by armies nowadays are very modern 
and applying them to distant events is misleading”.161
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